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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
America the Polarized?
Those of us who participated in the original March
on Wa hington in August, 1963 will forever remember
it as one of the great public moments of our lives. We
were part of a grand historic occasion, privileged both
to witness an unsurpassed rhetorical performanceMartin Luther King's "I have a dream" speech- and to
be included in a mass political protest whose moral
rectitude we would never have reason, even for a minute, to doubt. There was no uncertainty, no ambiguity:
we marched in the ranks of human decency, and no one
with a good political conscience could march against us.
Not often does politics offer opportunities of such
unsullied good faith.
The new March on Washington of this past August 27
was an exercise in nostalgia, an attempt to relive and
rekindle the moral fervor and political momentum of
the original event. But in politics as in life, you can't
go home again. This year's march was of an entirely
different, and lesser, order than that of twenty years
ago. The crowds were there, and the oratory strained to
meet the occasion (the strain showed: Jesse Jackson's
"from the outhouse to the White House" fell considerably short of King's magnificent cadences), but we doubt
that anyone seriously supposes that the second March
on Washington will carry anything like the historical
resonance of the first.
It lacked, to begin with, moral focus and clarity. When
King marched, the issue was simple: fundamental human and social rights for black Americans. To oppose
them was to oppose what America was all about. The
marchers carried with them the promise of American
life, and, deep down, almost all Americans understood
that-which is why Congress wrote into law in the 1964
and 1965 Civil Rights Acts those things that the marchers insisted on.
This time around, Congress could only meet the
marchers' demands by arranging to vote in the millennium or, at the very least, by decreeing that life be no
longer difficult. A protest o tensibly committed to job ,
peace, and freedom contained within it ranks element
of every cause imaginable. They wer all there: from
the mainstream (civil right , nuclear freeze, economic
ju tice) to beyond the fringe ( ikh for peace, boycott
Campbell's oup, outhern dyke for human right ).
number of communi t and communi t-front group
added to the march' breadth of ran
if not to it political legitimacy.
Like
in ton Churchill puddin thi mar h had
October. 19&'3

no theme. Even on the issue of civil rights, it could not
command the moral urgency of its predecessor. The
world is not necessarily a more complicated place than
it was twenty years ago, but the civil rights issue certainly is. On matters of affirmative action (employment
and educational quotas) and compulsory busing, there
is not at all the kind of self-evident moral consensus that
could be presupposed in 1963 with regard to political
rights and guarantee of equal access to public goods and
facilities. The moral lines were less clearly drawn this
past August than two decades ago, and no matter how
often or how desperately speakers invoked Martin
Luther King's presence, the occasion had nothing of
the moral grandeur of the original.
And beyond the issue of civil rights, moral ambiguity
drifted into moral anarchy. Organizers of the march,
exhibiting the protest culture's customary absence of
humility, christened their movement the New Coalition
of Conscience. If so, the conscience in question appear
notably expansive and latitudinarian. In embracing all
causes all at once, the march necessarily sacrificed coherence and precision. Save the world, save the whales:
everything dissolved into everything el e with little
sense of priority or ethical discrimination. One couldn't
help recalling Rome's traditional rebuke to Protestant
enthusiasts that in following the dictates of con cience,
we must first ensure that our conscience are rightly
informed.
Yet it would be misleading to focu too narrowly on
the march's lack of a moral center. The mar her w r
in fact united, but the ground of their unity wa p liti al
rather than moral. The glue that held v rythin
I
together was, as one peak r expre d it, a mmitm nt
to "rid the world of Reagani m." It wa in opp iti n t
the President and to the p lici a o iat d with hi ·
Admini tration that th
di parat gr u
on to march in uni on. Ronald R a an ha b
m

Beyond Reagan as symbol, it is difficult to define precisely the nature of the ideological
gulf that divides those who marched and those who would have nothing to do with the march.

even detest, on ideological grounds.
Beyond Reagan a ymbol, it i difficult to define
precisely the nature of the ideological gulf that divide
those who marched and those who would have nothing
to do with the march. Some de cribe it simply in socioconomic terms as a contrast between haves and have
nots, between those whom the system treats well and
those whom it treats badly. Gloria Steinem, the feminist
leader, apparently had something like this in mind when
she remarked that the only people not represented in
the march were wealthy middle-aged white males. (For
her, this meant the almost certain defeat of President
Reagan in 1984.)
But it was not only the poor and disadvantaged who
took part in the march. Steinem herself is part of a
group that, while it might have serious grievances
against the system, is not located anywhere near the
bottom of America's socio-economic ladder. Feminism
is a largely middle-class phenomenon. So is the gay
rights movement. So also is the anti-nuclear cause that
played so prominent a role in the march. Contemporary
American political divisions cannot be understood
simply in terms of class.
A satisfactory explanation of our ideological divisions
must take into account all those issues beyond economics
that do not fall neatly into class categories. We might
say that our most critical distinction lies between those
who can basically affirm current American values, systems, and practices and those who cannot. Such a distinction makes room for economic grievances and satisfactions but does not confine itself to them. It allows
room as well for consideration of issues involving social
policy, foreign affairs, and cultural style. Those who
fervently oppose Reagan and who found themselves in
sympathy with the march are those who feel alienated
in some fundamental way from American reality; those
who support Reagan (or oppose him without emotional
fervor) and who see no reason to march are those who
feel essentially comfortable with that reality. Many
Americans, to be sure, would resist making so stark a
choice, but events like the march indicate that it is in
such a polarized direction that our politics is heading.
Behind many of our specific disagreements over policy
choices lie entirely conflicting perceptions of what
America is and what it ought to be.
We have seen all this before. In the late Sixties and
early Seventies disagreements over race relation and
Vietnam threatened to tear the country apart. People
on oppo ite sides of issues came to doubt their opponents' patriotism and morality. Soon they were fighting
over rightful appropriation of national symbols: remember when you could read people' politic by observing whether or not they tuck flag decals in their
car window ? It wa an ugly and divisive time during
4

which merican on oppo in id
f th
ultural divide becam , in Rain r
. Baum phr
" thi al
tranger ' to on anoth r.
We are not yet back to uch an impa
but omin u
igns abound.
hat w ar one a ain in dan r of
lo ing i the ability to agr to di agr e. That b com
difficult when political difference r gularly get tran lated into moral categorie . Thu many of tho who
participated in the Wa hington march would rej ct the
analysis offered here that di tinguishe b tween political and moral elements in their prote t. For them opposition to Ronald Reagan i les a political opportunity
"than a moral imperative. When large numbers of people start thinking that way, political civility cannot long
be maintained. Many of our intellectuals and religious
leaders have already lined up at the political barricades,
and the rest of us may not be far behind.
The critical question is whether the moralistic mood
will come to dominate political practice. In 1972, the
Democratic party in a spasm of reform set up a system
of campaign and convention rules whose result was the
nomination of George McGovern, a man who wanted
less to govern the country than to save its soul.
McGovern's nomination, achieved at a convention that
had earnestly rid itself of the influence of professional
politicians, marked the high tide of the politics of conscience; his crushing loss to Richard Nixon brought the
Democrats back to reality. The lesson of McGovernism
has not been forgotten. One can't help noticing that the
nomination of a new McGovern (perhaps Alan Cranston, or even, now that he has entered the race,
McGovern himself) is the prospect Republican politicians most hope for and Democratic politicians most
dread. Gloria Steinem is wrong: President Reagan will
be a formidable opponent for any Democrat, especially
one situated on the Left. And realistic Democrats understand that.
Yet even if the politicians, operating out of traditional
instincts of self-preservation, manage in the short run
to paper over the cultural fissures in our society, we will
find it difficult to resist indefinitely the pressures toward polarization. The influence of the adversary culture continues to grow. It already pervades the mainstream church bureaucracies, the universities, and the
elite media outlets. The people there, gripped in antinomian enthu iasms, view with dismay and even cont mpt an America dominated in their eyes by racism,
xi m militarism, and indifference to the fate of the
poor. The distance between the dissenters and Middle
merica is vast.
half-century ago John Do Pa o
d dared with radical bravado, "all right we are two
nation . 'H wa wrong th n but today ... well toda
who i to ay?

...••
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Capitalism and the Moral Order

The Limits of Commercial Republicanism

Robert Benne

This essay is in the nature of an elaboration on one of
the themes of my book, The Ethic of Democratic Capitalism:
A Moral Reassessment (Fortress, 1981). In the last chapter
of the book, I argue that one of the most important challenges facing our social system concerns the "cultural
sphere," which I define as "the realm of symbolic meanings which give order, coherence, and moral direction
to the whole society." Following Daniel Bell and, before
him, Joseph Schumpeter, I raise the perplexing question whether capitalism will be destroyed by its successes
rather than its failures. Both thinkers suggest that the
culture produced by the successful workings of the market economy undercuts the values needed for economic,
political, and social vitality. Successful capitalism, in a
context of liberty, markets a short-sighted, chaotic, and
selfish hedonism.
As I put the question: Can a people survive the combination of widespread affluence and freedom? Will
their value system erode and finally collapse, necessitating an authoritarian solution that will neither tolerate freedom nor produce affluence? I end that chapter
in a properly ambivalent manner, recognizing the danger we face but affirming a resilient health in the American moral-social order that will resist the centrifugal
forces of hedonist culture. That moral health is based
finally on the strength of a religious appropriation of
reality, and I conclude that we may be experiencing a
genuine religious renewal in this land. At least we have
a fighting chance for such a renewal, given the strength
and variety of our religious institutions.
That concluding chapter, however, was rather sketchy
and unresolved, so I welcome the opportunity to engage
in more thorough and systematic reflection on this
subject, so that my conclusions can be more thoroughly
and systematically unresolved.
When I engage persons in discussion about this erosion of the moral-social order, I get two sets of responses

Robert Benne is the Jordan-Trexler Professor of Religi,on
at Roanoke College and Director of the College's Center for
Church and Society. He earlier served for seventeen years as
Professor of Church and Society al the Lutheran School of
Theology at Chicago. This essay orig-£nated as a public lecture
delivered at Gustavus Adolphus College in December, 1982.
October, 1983

that might serve as a useful context for further reflection. One set I call the "not to worry" response, which
catches the smugness of that proper English expression.
The other set is the "I told you so" response, which
relishes the connection of corrupt motivation with capitalist economic arrangements. I will analyze and quarrel with these two sets of responses, and then report on
my own struggle to relate the market economy to the
moral-social order.
"Not to Worry"

Persons in this camp either deny that there is any real
threat to the moral-social order, or, more likely, they
see no real connection between that order and the economic order. In either case, they see no serious moral
element impinging on economic life. At most, they say,
the cultural sphere can predispose people toward
healthy or unhealthy economic attitudes. Religious and
moral traditions may inhibit viable economic life, as in
the distrustful clannishness reported in Edward Banfield's analysis of the moral basis of backward societie ,
or it may facilitate economic life, as in the Protestant
Ethic's orientation toward inner-worldly a ceti i m.
But these are really not in the realm of morality, but
are rather in that of desired or undesired non-moral

a
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In the resplendent utilitarianism of the commercial republicans, politics and economics came
to care for the body, and the soul-devoted to virtue and perfection-slipped out of sight.

the prudent and proper ways to fulfill their necessities
and strive for their wants. (This is not reason with a
capital "R"; it is much more modest than that.)
This view of human being, assumed in most microeconomic texts, does not depend much on morality.
Even when it seems to, on closer look it involves a prudential morality, one that relies on fear of the loss of
one's interest as a discipline for right action. This is
neatly illustrated in a very attractive essay by Alfred
Kahn on "The Place of Ethical Values in a Market System" (National Economic Research Associates, Inc. ,
January 1981). Exhorting all of us to more restraint in
our economic life, Kahn concludes: "Even pure selfinterest has plenty of room in it for compromise and
moderation, for considering that if I do this to all the
rest of you, you will in time do the same to me, and we
will all end up frustrated. "
One should not easily dismiss such a position, for it
anchors economic life in something very solid indeed;
it does not try to base it on the fragile flower of morality.
What's more, a whole paradigm of civilization can be
constructed on this firm bedrock, one that has much to
say for it and that bears an uncanny resemblance to
our own.
Recently, two very interesting attempts have been
made to uncover the intellectual and historical roots of
such a paradigm. Ralph Lerner, in an essay called
"Commerce and Character: The Anglo-American as
New-Model Man" (Liberation South, Liberation North
[Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981]), calls
this paradigm "commercial republicanism." Drawing
from intellectual resources as diverse as Montesquieu
and John Adams, Adam Smith and Benjamin Franklin,
David Hume and Benjamin Rush, the proponents of
the new order were united in this: "they saw in commercial republicanism a more sensible and realizable alternative to earlier notions of civic virtue and a more just
alternative to the theological-political regime that had
so long ruled Europe and its colonial periphery."
Rather than base the new civilization on the vainglorious imagination and pretension of aristocratic and religious tradition, which constantly led to fanaticism,
intolerance, and economic stagnation or disaster, the
commercial republicans proceeded from the ordinary
passions of ordinary men.
Indeed , where the ancient polity , Christianity , and the feudal aristocracy, each in its own fashion , sought to conceal, deny , or thwart
most of the common passion for private gratification and ph ysical
comfort. the commercial republic built on those passions.

And the mechanism for satisfying and harnessing
those passions was the market. While the market was
certainly not the instrument for realizing the grand
dreams of priests and kings, it was the perfect vehicle
6

for realizing th e m ild ambition f middling m n . T h
ethos created by uch an ar ran m nt led t a mod rat
and pragmatic polity, which wid ned th ch an
of
freedom and pro p erity fo r m ore p opl . To qu v ill
put it well: "Violent p olitical p a ion h av little hold
on m en whose whole thoughts ar b nt on the pur uit
of well-being. Their excitement about m all matter
makes them calm about great one ." What a marvelous
way to place both economics and politics beneath morality, and in so doing build the bourgeois city!
Alan Bloom in "Commerce and Culture" ( This World
[Fall, 1982]) argues a similar line, but emphasizes the
revolutionary break from traditional philosophy taken
by the proponents of commercial republicanism. In
building on low but solid ground, the emerging bourgeois civilization defused the dynamite lurking in the
older perfectionist ideals. In its resplendent utilitarianism, politics and economics came to care for the body,
and the soul-devoted to virtue and perfection-slipped
away. It is not as though there was no room for virtue,
truth, and perfection in the commercial republic; they
were just edged off the main stage and became thankfully irrelevant to economics and politics. The market
took over center stage and has remained there ever since.
The modern libertarians of course are in the lineage
of the commercial republicans. But their orientation
propounds a cold rationalism rather than the homey
naturalism of the intellectual architects of the commercial republic. The earlier writers wrote against the backdrop of the old regime; they knew there were other
paradigms than the commercial. And they knew the
losses that came with the shift. Our current commercial
republicans agree with their progenitors in their view
of the centrality of the market as the organizing arena
for most of life, in their animus toward perfectionist
politics, and in their enthusiasm to extend marginal
utility theory into family life, law, and politics. The only
difference is that they are not aware that their applications drive out the soul.
I have spent so much time on proponents of the "not
to worry" school because they are so formidable, not so
much in their libertarian guise, but in the form of the
innumerable practical thinkers and actors in our common life who have done so much to make this a tolerable
commercial republic. But I think even they may be
somewhat uneasy with the present state of affairs. Before
I take up why I think they might be uneasy, though, I
want to examine the other school, which is such a delight to us all.
"I Told You So "

This school's view of the relation of the market economy to the moral order is well known. We hear it reThe Cresset

Economic life in market systems is neither as independent of morality as the commercial republicans
(and today's libertarians) insist nor as opposed to it as their anti-capitalist critics maintain.
p at dly from many intellectuals of the church, from a
pr ponderance of liberally educated persons, from
Marxi t and sociali ts, from many segments of the disadvantaged , and from those who claim to represent the
di advanta ed. This perspective does not agree with
chumpeter and Bell that the effects of successful capitalism may lead to untoward moral and cultural results
through the melancholy fact that the human race cannot
handle affluence and freedom at the same time. On the
contrary, from this perspective capitalist economic
arrangements-market economies-are in principle
opposed to the moral life. Conflict between the market
economy and morality is inescapable. And this school
certainly does not agree that one can build an adequate
economy or polity on some trustworthy base below the
level of morality, as the commercial republicans insist.
What one will get is indeed low and base. Let me quote
a former colleague's response to my book:
Benne is sensitive to flaws in American society. but he lets the system off too easily when he locates these flaws primarily in terms of
personal and social moral character. Americans are in mad pursuit
of pleasure , self-indulgent , selfish , etc. No doubt that's true. Our
doctrine of original sin tells us that these flaws lie in human nature.
What is happening is that the American system-democratic capitalism-magnifies these flaws , drives them to extremity, and unleashes the rawest kinds of human impulses into the public sector.
And so class conflicts , racial rivalry , crime, violence, murder, abortion , imperialistic wars, and lots more are the social fallout of a system that has worshipped the Golden Calf of capitalist economics.

There you have it stated with a bit of passion. Market
economies encourage, legitimate, magnify, and even
generate human greed. They are poison to human motivation, and the values they spew out are incompatible
with morality.
The social effects of the system, rather than the homey
harmony of the commercial republicans, include the
generation of inequality, the destruction of community
before the onslaughts of "possessive individualism," the
imposition of exorbitant social costs on the most defenseless members of society, and a vulgarized and debased culture.
When such a corrosive system is unleashed on the
broader world, we get an international social darwinism
that feeds on the poor and oppressed of the world. The
little fish are eaten by the big ones, and the system that
allows that to happen, and in fact encourages it, is the
international market system-capitalism.
This perspective is too well known to chronicle
further. It simply denies that the market economyand the polity that combines with it-leads to the kind
of results the commercial republicans claim. Building
a system on the lowest common denominator makes the
lowest normative. Capitalism is antithetical to morality,
and the only proper response to it is to transform it into
October, 1983

some new economic arrangement.
A Constructive Conversation

In the following I wish to argue that economic life in
market systems is neither as independent of morality as the
commercial republicans (and their latter-day saints- the
libertarians) aver nor as opposed to it as their anti-capitalist
critics maintain. (My remarks will not wrestle with that
anomaly on the intellectual frontier, George Gilder,
who makes the theological and moral virtues of faith,
hope, and love the driving springs of capitalism. No
one quite knows what to make of him.)
A wise person once told me that the best discussion
emerges from conversation among friendly criticsparties who share enough to be able to argue constructively about their differences. I'm a friendly critic of
the commercial republicans, for I believe their more
modest expectations for civil life and for history itself
have led to results that outstrip their expectations. On
the whole, commercial republics are more attractive
than any of the perfectionist models; they have achieved
a more persuasive mix of freedom, tolerance, innovation, social equality, mobility, and general well-being
than their competitors. They certainly do have their
glaring flaws and injustices, but their real achievements
indicate that reformation is a more fitting response than
transformation.
These ambiguously positive assessments of democratic capitalism are characterized by my critics under
another name-complacency. But I do not believe that
passion for reform needs to be fueled by dramatically
unbalanced judgments. Such a stolid attitude probably
betrays my social position and implicit self-definition.
I fancy myself something of an intellectual of th p opl
and of the laity-the middling men and worn n in society and church who carry on the day-to-day work of
our common existence. Perhap there i a ve tigial bit
of that Nebraska spirit in me that drove Roman Hru ka,
a fittingly anonymous senator from that stat , to ar
that Harold Carswell should be nam d to th

bri f thin
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The self must be nurtured, loved, educated, introduced into civilization by a community of personsfirst the family in its nuclear and extended form, but beyond that by friends, school, and church.

critics. First, I find their assessments of American democratic capitalism terribly unbalanced. They tend to play
the game unfairly, I believe. They simply lop off all the
achievements and exaggerate the evils. Anyone can
"prove" this country to be a monstrosity by focusing on
the dark underside of American life. But certainly there
is much more than that, or we would have more radical
politics than we have.
Second, they tend to demonize self-interest in an
unhelpful and, I believe, hypocritical way. Any human
being possesses a certain power of being that is e-2\pressed
toward the world through a quest for survival, pleasure,
love, friendship, new experience, meaning, achievement, salvation. Every self has a set of interests that are
pushed into the world. The market coordinates many of
these for the human community in rather remarkable
ways. Most of our mutually beneficial exchanges are
very routine and uncontentious. No great moral dimensions are attached to them. But business makes the
big mistake of being too honest. It talks of profits and
returns, and these words have been made to symbolize
greed by the "I Told You So" crowd. Meanwhile, however, the "I Told You So" people generally play very
well in the m_arket game. (One of the most vocal anticapitalists in our Chicago neighborhood-a Lutheran
pastor-led the local investment club and was, I am
told, very good at it.) Moreover, the self-interest expressed in their chosen vocations is often disguised under more high-sounding terms like "professional distinction," "service" to this or that institution, the
"search for truth," or "fighting for justice." Self-interest
is present in all expressions of human being; it need be
neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy. We can all
admit to it without using it as a moral club with which
to beat our ideological opponents.
Third, this camp generally underestimates the reality
of the workably competitive markets operating in this
country. They are therefore unaware of the expertise,
persistence, and discipline it takes to survive in th~
marketplace. This makes them underestimate how much
that market restrains self-interest and bends it to the
good of customers and consumers. The "I Told You So"
crowd tends to think that the market is a congeries of
political clout and privilege; you really don't have to
gain success in it the old-fashioned way-by earning it.
As one harassed businessman told a theologian after a
spirited ~xchange: "Let's have you start a business and
see it through for a couple of years. Then let's come
back and see if you make the same criticisms."
Now, having offered a few arguments against those
that see a built-in opposition between the market economy and the moral order, let us spend more time in
dialogue with the spirit of commercial republicanism,
which continues to pervade mainstream economic
8

theory and practice in thi count
camp should have riou
orri
v
sult from its neglect of th moral- o ial ord r.
A Non-Historical View of the elf

I started my description of the
ot To Worry"
school by reporting the confidence it ha that people
can be trusted to follow their elf-interest in way rather
healthy to themselves and others, if they act them out
freely in a market context. They know their own survival needs accurately; they can order them rationally
and figure out the prudent ways to get them. The productive apparatus will respond to those preferences,
and producers, if held accountable by a competitive
market, will supply them well. All of this goes on with
little or no guidance from the moral-social order. It
operates beneath the moral level.
Such a non-historical view of human beings is a
faulty one-it does not account for the moral predispositions it takes to make a market system work effectively
on the production side, or the predispositions it takes
for persons to select survival v~lues as preferences on
the consumption side. In either case, the moral predispositions are the products of communities that form and
shape the self. Selves are not exclusively the products
of social history, but they are dramatically conditioned
by their social context. The self must be nurtured,
loved, educated, introduced into civilization by a community of persons-first the family in its nuclear and
extended form, but beyond that by friends, school, and
church. These communities convey those moral predispositions to developing selves, providing them with
a guidance system ·for both their productive and consuming lives.
There never was such a thing as unbridled capitalism. There may have been times when there were few
external limits to developing enterprises, but if Max
Weber is right about the connection between Calvinism
and capitalism, there was a good deal of Calvinist moral
guidance involved in capitalist development. Also, the
great medieval Catholic moral tradition operated as a
backdrop before which Calvinism could make its revisions. The capacity for promise-making and promisekeeping beyond the tribe was a moral precondition for
market systems to develop, and those religious and
moral traditions nurtured them.
There is more to say about morality and the productive side of life. But first I want to dwell more intently
on the consumption side. The question is this: can persons really register life-enhancing preferences in the
marketplace without a healthily functioning moral
order, as the "not to worry" people suggest? Or do there
exist capacities for real self-destruction?
The Cresset

We are withdrawing the nurturing context from our young. We have nearly abdicated bringing them
up. The young are bringing themselves up. And the results are scarily visible all around us.
m ri can ciety today is a great testing ground for
r ol ing th
questions. For I believe we are withdrawin th nurturing context from our young. We
h av nearly abdicated bringing them up. The young
are bringing them selves up. And the results are visible
to an yone around young p eople a lot, such as those employed by colleges and universities.
One of the jarring new experiences I have had in
moving from seminary to college comes from the encounter with r eally unhinged young people. Many
faculty are shielded from this experience because they
are often the last people the disoriented young will
come to. But they will come to chaplains and faculty if
those p ersons give off signals of availability and compassion. And the reports I get from these persons are
rather alarming: aimlessness and boredom, loneliness,
lack of self esteem and purpose issuing in suicidal
threats, gestures, and serious attempts. Widespread use
and abuse of alcohol and drugs trigger the self-destructive impulses. Not all students are unhinged of course;
students from small towns and rural areas seem to fare
better than the metropolitans. Traditional culture is
stronger there. But among the metropolitan middle
and upper-middle educated classes, the news is bad.
Both mother and dad are working and have done so
for a long time. Families do not eat, worship, or play
together, let alone converse seriously. There are numerous family breakups in the background of these
troubled kids. Or deep estrangement issuing in infidelity or an undertow of disaffection. There is a surprising
amount of sexual abuse. The churches provide little
authority or structured nurture for them; the churches
themselves are confused about moral norms. Schools
have long since withdrawn from the formation of character and the teaching of ethics; they have a hard enough
time with teaching basic skills. Colleges were frightened
out of their in loco parentis role in the late Sixties and
early Seventies. So much for their confidence in inherited standards of excellence and moral virtue. They
stand by as students get bombed at mid-week parties
and miss classes the next day. Faculty members bemusedly retreat from the din-sometimes called music
-and sexual disorder that students bathe themselves in.
What is left? At earlier stages of life television is the
teacher; long hours before the tube become the way our
young are introduced to the adult world. It is a world of
dishonest advertising, galloping consumerism , leering
sexuality, stereotyped shadows of human beings, immediate gratification, sexual relations normally unmarked
by restraint and long-term fidelity , the glorification of
the abnormal and rebellious. Such attempts a are made
at portraying the healthy and conventional tend to be
sentimental and phony.
Why is thi stuff elected out of televi ion market
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offerings ? Why does it sell? Perhaps because there are
no serious alternatives; the moral order is on its way
toward disintegration. Persons emerging from this
chaotic social context will not be productive agents in
the world nor will they select noble human values from
the offerings that the market provides.
Later on the shaping community becomes the world
of peers. High school and college kids lead each other;
and by and large it is the blind leading the blind. The
kids will tolerate almost anything from their peers because they have little beyond them to make judgments
about them. (By the way, please do not take this to mean
that Roanoke College has a more serious problem than
other schools. I do not believe that is true ; in fact , we
may be ahead of others by facing up to it more directly.)
Joseph Schumpeter noticed what I am trying to point
to back in the early Forties, and he said it so well that I
want to quote him at some length. H e is talking about
the decomposition of the motivational system of capitalism through the socialization of the bourgeois mind,
a process that he believed would eventually kill capitalism's motivational roots.
As soon as men and women [notice hi s early inclusiveness I learn the
utilita rian lesson a nd refuse to take for granted the traditional
arrangements that their social enviro nment makes for them. as soo n
as they acquire the h abit of weigh ing the individual advantages and
di sadvantages of any prospective cou rse of action-or a we might
put it. as soon as they introdu ce into their private life a sort of inarticulate system of cost accounti ng-they cannot fail to become aware
of the heavy perso nal sacrifices that fami ly ties and especially parenth ood entail under modern cond itions and of the fact that at the
same time child ren cease to be economic assets.

Schumpeter goes on to argue th at this kind of co t accounting is most certainly wrong, for:
The greatest of the assets . the contribution made by parenthood to
ph ysical and moral health -to "normality" as we might exprc it particularly in the case of women. almost invariably e ap s th
rational searchl ight of modern individuals who tend to fo us att ·ntion on ascertai nab le details of immediate utilitarian rel vane and
to sneer at the idea of hidden necessities of human natur or of th
social organism . These individual ask "Why hould we tunt our
ambitio ns and impoverish our live in order to b insulted and
looked down upon in our old age? " ( Cap1talzsm, . ocialzsm and
Democracy, pp. 157-158 ).

We cannot have an ad quat m ral
respon ible parenthood and fami ly lif .
ann t hav
a functioning mark t y t m without a h alth m ral
order. Economic h a · a I t to d
ith that rd r and w
mu t worry about it.
Freedom

ur latt r-d a c mm r ial r publi
freed om and if I r ad p pl lik
corr tl y, that i f r th m th prima
erv d and
t nd d.
w I agr \ ith mu h

I would not want to argue that prudential morality is not a powerful reality or that it is
unnecessary. It is real and necessary. But it is not sufficient and we are finding that out.

argument but I think that human are even more free
than they think and their truncated version of human
freedom underestimates the capacity for both creativity
and sin in their interpretation of human action. This
leaves their economic philosophy with a certain blindness toward human will-to-power that operates in all
dimensions of human existence, including the economic.
They tend to underestimate power relationships in the
marketplace.
The commercial republicans do know about selfinterest in economic life, and they do think it is best
disciplined by competition, but there is an intimation
that the market can indeed handle that self-interest because prudent reason, when faced by competition, will
submit to its discipline. Further, the prudent reason of
individuals is projected onto large enterprises. Commercial republicans often argue that corporations are
only collections of individuals and that they act like an
individual writ large. Thus, this economic outlook
tends to be unaware of the driving will-to-power in individual, but especially, corporate economic life.
I quoted Tocqueville earlier to the effect that the
commercial classes have little violent political passion
because their excitement on small matters makes them
calm about great ones. But when economic life is carried
on by giants, excitement funneled through those large
entities is no longer a small matter. It can overrun other
competitors, individuals, governments, whole countries.
Enterprises are not only larger than those of Tocqueville's day, but the human spirit is larger than our economic philosophy assumes and its excitement can be
more harmful and evil than expected. That is because
human freedom is indeterminate. It is self-transcending
freedom that seeks ultimate security but at the same time
knows death is its fate. Anxiety is our lot as centers of
self-transcendence. But, as Ernest Becker argued, we all
are engaged in strategies that deny death. We attach
ourselves to winners who for the moment can fend off
the overwhelming insignificance and mortality that is
ours. The commercial republicans knew this was true
of religious and political life, but they didn't think it
operated in economic life, because that dealt with milder ambitions and passions.
The story of John DeLorean should dash that fond
illusion in individual life, and the story of ITT's behavior in Chile should dash it at the corporate level.
Those stories could be multiplied. The point i that
indeterminate will-to-power is expressed through economic life, especially in its corporate form, and it will
seek to override the restraints of the market or find
places where there are no market restraints. Economic
power is no less dangerous than political; sin operate
there too. And in societies where the church and the
polis have been pushed to the periphery by the market
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a an rganizing paradigm, on mi \ ill-t - ,. r ma
be ev n mor dan rou .
hat i the up hot of thi
rd r? ir t
that the moral- ocial ord r an pr id int rnal r straints on individual that th mark t it lf cann t
provide. The John DeLorean ,. ill not be d terr d by
the di cipline of the market. econd th polity, r fl ting the values of the moral order, mu t often be ummoned to limit economic-will-to-power in a commercial
republic. Economic freedom is more dangerou than th
Friedmans of the world maintain, and its restraint mu t
often come from beyond the market.
Prudential Morality

The economic philosophy of latter-day commercial
republicanism overestimates the capacity of prudential
morality to sustain a market economy. In trying to operate at the low and solid level beneath morality, its moral
theory-sometimes called marginal utility theory-is
really a kind of ethical egoism. It is prudential morality
which, as Immanuel Kant argued, is not really morality
in its strictist sense because it engages in right action
under threat of loss or hope for gain. Public exposure,
loss of customers, disapproval of others, or legal penalties prove counter to one's interest so actions that lead
to such results are avoided. Conversely, actions which
lead to the opposite are engaged in.
I for one would not want to argue that prudential
morality is not a powerful reality or that it is unnecessary. It is real and necessary. But it is not sufficient and
we are finding that out. We are becoming more and
more aware of two gaps in economic life that are not
handled by prudential morality.
The first gap is between what the law says is prohibited and what the law actually uncovers and punishes.
In an increasingly complex and massive society, that
gap is painfully real. Violent crimes are often unsolved
and unpunished. But the myriad of non-violent "white
collar" and "boardroom" crimes are even harder to detect and punish. For the most part, crime does pay.
Prudential morality is not very persuasive here. If the
risks are assessed and found to be less than the benefits
gained, prudence may push one toward the illegal.
My conversations with business people over the years
convince me that many moral problems arise for them
when they are told by their firms to engage in illegal
behavior because there is little chance of getting caught.
This indicates the failure of prudential morality as it i
practiced by the leadership of those firms.
A econd gap is that between legally and morally permis ible behavior For example, it may not be illegal for
insurance alespersons to ell highly limited health and
life in urance policies to elderly per on who are not
The Cresset

The need for ethically sensitive persons in business is being recognized by our businesses and
colleges, but these institutions must build upon character formed earlier by the moral-social order.

awar of tho limitation . o doubt the limits are there
in th fin print. o doubt, if asked, the salesperson will
alm t tell th truth. But the fine print is not read and
th qu lion are not a ked. And many of these policies
ar old. (I my elf feel almost helpless before the experti of a good insurance salesperson.) An authentically
moral per on would not engage in such selling, but the
prudentiali t might well.
Both of these gaps illustrate that there must be internal re ources in the actor that provide moral guidance.
The web of external interactions may not suffice. Moral
character must fill these gaps, and that comes only from
formation in the moral-social order. Only those persons
who act for intrinsic reasons can be trusted in such situations. An executive I know is in charge of deciding
whether his firm will enter foreign markets. Many of
these markets are in countries where graft is the order
of the day; it may even be legal under the laws of those
lands. He will engage in some such operations, but he
has a set of intuitive limits. As he puts it, "If I start playing with skunks, I start smelling like one, and I don't
like myself." He has internal restraint.
We are even more dependent on moral character
from beyond the market-place when we look for the
generation of moral idealism rather than just moral restraint. Who will be able to imagine a more expansive
picture of business responsibility, who will be attuned
to the genuine human needs of employees, who will take
risks of moral leadership? Certainly not the prudentialists.
The need for ethically sensitive persons in business
is being recognized by our businesses, colleges, and universities, but these institutions must build upon character that is formed earlier by the moral-social order.
In summary, I have sought to engage in a friendly
argument with the spirit of commercial republicanism,
a spirit that has tried to shape economic theory and
practice independent of morality. Or at least it has tried
to make it less dependent on morality than is warranted.
Therefore, it has not worried as much as it ought about
the moral order. This fault, I have maintained, stems
from its rather non-historical view of human nature, its
naturalistic view of human freedom, and its exces ive
reliance on prudential morality. In short, it does not
recognize the indispensability of a healthy moral order.
That order forms character toward life-enhancing
values and preferences, tames and directs the longings
of a free human spirit into constructive channel , and
provides an inner set of moral restraint and a pirations.
In order to end with con tructive uggestions I offer
the following:
1. Economic theory mu t be revi ed to take a more
hi torical view of human nature. The in titutionali t
chool ha much to offer here. Likewi , th in i ht of
October, 19&'3

Marx, without the determinist and dialectical dogma,
will be of use.
2. Colleges like ourselves must insist on broad liberal
arts education. By that I mean those in the humanities
must also study economics, and vice versa. The liberal
arts vision of educating the whole person was never
more crucial than it is today. Further, faculty on our
campuses should be about the kind of dialog that overcomes the centrifugal forces of modern learning.
3. Above all, we must devote ourselves to strengthening the institutions that constitute the moral-social order. We must begin with our families, for that is where
formation is most powerful. We simply have to spend
more time and energy on nurture. Our schools must be
able to engage in moral education that is not narrowly
sectarian. Our churches must devote more structured
ministry to the young. And our church colleges must
encourage and enrich the virtue of those who arrive
with it, and initiate it in those who don't.
Cl

Emmy
And he who sat upon the throne
said, "Behold, I make all things
new." Revelation 21 :15.

Over the cracked bronze clay of Georgia
North to Promised Land's cemented city,
telling dreams and children both , "Endure!",
she fought. While eastward th y at waiting.
Then more of culling gold from R v lati n.
More of feeding children dream , and m r
cajoling green from clay left over. till ,
as time ran out, th y waited.
First her timid tapping, th n th p uncling.
Finally her tubborn a king at half- p n d
doors. udd nly, a f w how 1 om d and,
a promi ed, all thin
Oh uch hymn
Oh such flow r t
laughing from th h u
painting it ild Ra pb rry f r th ir waiting.

Lois Reiner
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Why Film Studies Gets No Respect

Taking Movies Seriously
Jeff Smith
Movies seem to be the only topic that gets a conversation rolling as effectively among my academic friends
and colleagues as among the folks back home. In fact,
once the discussion turns to a recent film, it's hard to tell
apart these two usually quite distinct social worlds.
Scholastics take to the topic as enthusiastically ~s nonacademic friends and family, who, by the same token,
swap judgments about movies as confidently and knowledgeably as do the intellectuals. To break through the
pall of polite chatter, whether about Derrida and dissertations on the one hand or church doings, TV, and
Aunt Edna's surgery on the other, just mention the
latest Hollywood enticement. I can't count the number
of times I've seen this work. The most recent was at a
lunch with members of a doctoral seminar in American
literature; for all their common departmental concerns
and weeks of joint reading and inquiry, this group of
advanced graduate students, scholars, and literary editors found movies to be the only subject they could
discuss with vigor.
An encouraging fact, perhaps, for we happy few specializing in film study, but not for reasons one would
likely guess. Because whatever it might seem, the way
intellectuals talk about movies is a sign not of an intellectually serious attitude toward film, but of the opposite: a pervasive and persistent weakness in the status
accorded film by intellectual culture, and not just in
idle conversation either. In fact, if we look more closely
at such conversation we see merely the shadow of a
struggle that has gone on for decades and that goes on
still at the very highest levels of film criticism and scholarship. It is a struggle over just how to go about taking
movies seriously.

I
Academics in established disciplines normally respect

Since gr~duating from Valparaiso University in 1980, Jeff
Smith has been studying film in the Department of English
at the University of Chicago, where he received an M.A. in
1981. At Valparaiso, he edited both the student newspaper
and the student literary magazine. At Chicago, he is supervisor of the Film Study Center. He has taught courses in Film
both at the University of Illinois-Chicago and in the Extension Program of the University of Chicago.
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each other's expertise. If they learn you are a peciali t
in the early Victorian novel (a popular medium in its
own time, of course, just like film), any judgments they
make on that subject will be carefully marked as "subjective." A comment like "I couldn't stand Barry Ly ndon" means, "I didn't enjoy reading Barry Ly ndon but
[or even, therefore ( !)] would never doubt that, as a
Text, it merits your serious attention." (Needless to say,
non-academics, also ~ware that these are matters for experts, are even more circumspect about them and won't
normally have even a "subjective" opinion to offer.)
But to identify your specialty as film is to invite the
opposite to happen. Here the response might be, "Oh,
did you see Superman Ill?" and from that moment no
one present will be bashful with opinions. In this context, "I couldn't stand Barry Lyndon" means simply,
Barry Lyndon was a bad, if not worthless, movie, and
never mind whether any or all knowledgeable critics
disagree about that. In fact, you will have little chance
to refer to this body of opinion, since your own knowledge will be mined only for arcana, or inside dope-as
though all students of film must naturally be subscribers
to Reel Life. (People who learn of my own formal training in film typically ask me questions that call less on
that training than on what I can remember from the
Sunday supplements.) Even more likely you will be
asked if you aim to make films, a question whose implications should be tediously familiar to most English
majors, tired as they are of explaining to non-academics
that literary studies aren't some kind of pre-vocational
training to write novels. In fact, what becomes clear is
that the value of film study as a discipline unto itself is
understood by intellectuals about as well as humanistic
studies generally are grasped by the public at large.
Partly this may owe to the fact that movies are current and one of the few cultural products held in common, even (or especially) among educated people. Also,
it must be said that some distinction still exists between
"high" or serious-usually European-film and the
standard, mass Hollywood product. But these facts
themselves are part of what needs explaining. And anyway, neither point holds up perfectly. The distinction
between "art" and Hollywood films is not as carefully
honored as, say, that between serious recent writing and
pulp fiction. And it seldom seems that other matters of
current or common knowledge provoke the same response as the movies. Psychology and linguistics also
deal with phenomena we all know, yet experts and laymen in these fields have little trouble distinguishing
The Cresset

Auteur critics showed that many ..hack" directors had actually brought considerable unity of
outlook and consistency of style to the ""trashy" commercial projects the studios had given them.

ach other. nd though a historian of the Johnson presidency or a political scientist studying the West Bank
might encounter strong opinions touching his or her
field , till it always seems that academics hold such
opinion conditionally, with a general willingness to
acknowledge the legitimacy of the discipline itself and
it canons, and above all the possibility of expertise.
It is precisely this acknowledgement that intellectual
culture denies film. A literary scholar might be well
aware that Faulkner wrote screenplays, and that some
of the greatest minds of this century have recorded their
appreciation for movies. But he will praise or vilify
Superman III just as readily nonetheless, and with no
apologies for any lack of formal film training. Superman
III doesn 't fall into the same category of conversation as
Faulkner. For most academics it's more like faculty
gossip or the weather, certainly not something that has
to be studied to be discussed. We might be tempted to
say that while everybody talks about the movies, nobody
ever does anything about them.

II
This half-joking paraphrase might seem easily refuted by the decades of intensive study film has received,
not only from film specialists but from some of the most
eminent scholars in other disciplines as well. The intellectual world seems to have been taking film seriously
for some time. By 1934, the year the famous Princeton
art historian Erwin Panofsky published his landmark
essay, "Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures," it
was certainly established that movies-not just abstruse,
experimental foreign films, but movies-might be a fit
topic for discussion by leading academics.
Actually, though, this essay tends to reveal the truth
of my little paraphrase. We can appreciate Panofsky's
boldly arguing, against what he assumed (probably correctly) to be widespread opposition to the idea, that
films are indeed art-in fact, one of the few really vital
modern arts precisely because of their mass appeal:
If all the serious lyrical poets, composers, painters a nd sculptors
were forced by law to stop their activities, a rath er small fractio n of
the general public would become aware of the fac t and a still smaller
fraction would seriously regret it. If the same thing were to hap ~e~
with the movies the social consequ ences would be catastrophic.

But in Panofsky's view this cultural vitality was bound
up with the fact that movies were a "folk art. " Panofsky's
way of justifying the movies was to argue that the very
1 From

the reprint of the Pa nofsky essay ( 194 7 revision ) in Ge rald
Mast and Marshall Cohen. ed s.. Film Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed.
(Oxford Univ. Press , 1979 ). O ther essays that I cite and that are reprinted in thi s anthology are: usan Sontag, " Film and Theatre."
1966 ; Andrew Sarri s, " otes on the Auteur T heory in 196 2"; and
Pauline Kael, "Circles and quares ." 1963 . Italics in all qu ote are
the authors'.
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qualities that had called their artistic value into question
were really the source of their worth. As against an elite
art like painting, Panofsky saw movies as being constrained by the demands of the market and the hard,
inviolable reality of the objects photographed. This
meant that films were "arrangements" of material things
rather than projections of some abstract concept in "the
artist's mind." And this was their glory. The response
of movies to these constraints was to discover their folkish appeal.
Obviously Panofsky's praise was somewhat patronizing; according to Susan Sontag, it paralleled a "vaguely
Marxist" condescension toward the movies' "vast uneducated audience." Certainly it did nothing to increase
appreciation for the film artist, whose importance in the
making of a Hollywood movie Panofsky explicitly
denied. This is the sense in which , for Panofsky , talking
about film was indeed like talking about the weather ,
another vital factor in people's lives that no one creates
and no one can much affect. Or at best, to use his own
analogy, filmmaking was like cathedral-building : the
producer is the archbishop, the director the chief architect, and on down the production/ construction hierarchy. Something like this view evidentl y pr vailed
for many years, judging from the fact that m an y Hollywood filmmakers were as little known and honored in
their time as medieval architects.
The fact that this has changed , and th at tod ay criti
greatly honor many of those ame filmm akers, is larg ly
due to the so-called " aut eur " (auth o r) th ory th at
emerged in France in the 1950 . Auteuri m wa an explicit effort to take the film artist eri ously. R j cting
Panofsky's "folk art" way of justifying m ovi s, whi h
essentially denied that a work needed a in gl arti 't in
order to have value as art, auteu r critic argued th at
even Hollywood studio film did have arti t - u uall y,
their directors- and they wer ea ily ab le to ·h w th at
many directors previou ly con id r cl "ha k ·" had a tually brought considerabl e unity of u tl ok an d onsistency of tyle to the "trashy" ommer ial pr j t th
studios had given them . · a r ult, th
r "pantheon of film director " alled for by ndr w
leading American auteuri t, ha n ,. larg I b n
lished.
In language a b ld a Pan f ky'
arris pr
d
the up hot of th n w att itud - an attitud d
cl t
do e the gap b tw n appr iating H II w
and b ing in tell tually · ri u · a ut film :
Like mo t Am nca n who tak film riou Iv . I have al\\·avs f ·It a
cultural inf rionty comp! ·x about Hollywcx>d. Ju t a f ·w y :ars ago .
I would hav th ought 1t unthinkabl lo peak in th· am br ·ath of a
"comme rcial" d1r tor like Hitchcock and a "pur·" dir·clor li k ·
Bre on Ev n toclav zght and ound u · diff ·r ·nt type iz .., for
Bre on a nd H itchcock fi lm After y ·ars of tortured r •valuation I
a m now pr par d t tak my critical r pulation. u h a it i . on th ·
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It has been argued that if we looked at movies the way we read serious literature, we would
pay more attention to the story as the real substance of the work and the source of its value.
proposition that Alfred Hitchcock is artistically uperior to Robert
Bresson by every criterion of excellence and , further, that , film for
film , director for director. the American cinema has been consistently superior to that of the rest of the world from 1915 [to the pre ent]. Consequently , I now regard the auteur theory primarily as a
critical device for recording the history of the American cinema, the
only cinema in the world worth exploring in depth beneath. the frosting of a few great directors at the top.

As influential as this view has been, it too had problems.
Since they were rediscovering overlooked directors, the
auteurists had a tendency (not unlike Panofsky's) to
place value on the very limitations and constraints that
had led to neglect of those directors in the first place.
Unlike Panofsky, the auteurists did credit individual
artists rather than "the medium" itself with finding ways
around the constraints. But still they took less joy in
filmmakers who created or controlled their own projects than in sheep who had been lost and were now
found. As Pauline Kael put it:

a criticism.
n obviou olution would b to d v lop an appr ach
to film using criteria rooted in om lar r
of
cultural or artistic value beyond film. Th b t r
nt
film writing has in different way tried to do thi . It ha
argued that movies mu t be looked at in ju t uch a
larger context in order to be taken really eriou ly. In
his new book on Howard Hawk , a favorite redi covered
filmmaker of the auteurists, Gerald Mast echoes Pauline Kael's complaints about the auteurists and further
adds that film theory in general has overvalued the
idea of directorial "style" at the expense of film stories.
If we looked at movies the way we read serious literature, says Mast, we would pay more attention to the
story as the real substance of the work and the source
of its value:
Jane Austen's Emma is admired as a rich , important human work ,
not solely for its carefully structured action, deeply and subtly observed characters , and gracefully perceptive writing but for the very
depth . ironies, and complexities of the moral system that permeates
it. .. Part of Jane Austen's reputation as a writer can be traced to
her ability to construct such a complex and insightful moral universe
as her means to elaborate her story of one woman's discovery . The
moral and philosophical seriousness of Shakespeare's Othello stems
from the same squrce-the elaboration of a rich moral universe
through action and character, based on human issues which are
enormously complicated and important.2

Their ideal auteur is the man who signs a long-term contract, directs
any script that's handed to him, and expresses himself by shoving
bits of style up the crevasses of the plots ... . The director who fights
to do something he cares about is a square.

Poor Dostoevsky, Kael mocked, "too full of what he has
to say" and "tackling important themes in each work" if the auteurist "inside dopesters" got hold of literature,
he would be discarded in favor of some forgotten hack
from the Saturday Evening Post.
Today's pervasively auteurist criticism has responded
to this charge by evolving a slightly different sort of
perversity. If film critics today no longer place value on
the fact of constraint, it is because this fact has almost
been forgotten. Typically any Hollywood director is
now assumed to be an auteur, and his work the outcome
of a conscious artistic strategy and vision. Kael's remark
that "these critics work embarrassingly hard trying to
give some semblance of intellectual respectability to a
preoccupation with mindless, repetitious commercial
products" seems even more apt with regard to what one
reads today in the Village Voice, where Andrew Sarris
still presides, and in similar trendy journals for the incrowd of upscale young (which journals, after all, must
find ways to take seriously their readers' pop-culture
tastes).
But the remark applies as well to the work of countless
contemporary film critics. If Panofsky took film art seriously at the expense of the artists, the auteurist mainstream of today tends to take some artists seriously at the
expense of the art. It tends overwhelmingly to judge
film by self-contained criteria-criteria, that is, derived
from and applicable only to film. Such a situation naturally leads either to "inside dope" or to the disease of
many newspaper film critics, for whom inchoate personal reactions ("This movie made me feel good") pass
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Bringing the same values to bear on the filmmaker in
question gives us this simple formula: "To demonstrate
that Hawks is of any value is to demonstrate that he
told good stories." And in turn, says Mast, this means
showing that he conveyed "a view of human life and
aspiration that is serious and complex," however little
this view calls attention to itself amid the seemingly
simple materials of Hawks' popular comedies, Westerns,
or war pictures.
Just by feeling he needs to argue all this, Mast confirms the persistent strength of film criticism's selfcontaining tendency. But in a different way Mast's judgments, too, are self-contained. When it comes to actually
analyzing Hawks' films, Mast may be generally applying
the standards of serious literary study, but he shows
little interest in drawing particular connections between
Hawks' recurring themes and issues and those of the
literature or culture of the era. He does little to locate
Hawks in this kind of larger scheme of intellectual and
cultural concerns.
Mast is very good on the "social" history of movies,
the history of their changing relations with TV, government, the Legion of Decency, and so forth (his other
recent book is the first serious collection of source documents on this subject). But his views on cultural history
are limited by his sense that the great artist of all periods, a Shake peare or an Austen as much a a Hawk
2

a t, Howard Hawks, toryteller(Oxford

niv . Pre . 1982 ). p. 34.
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In analyzing movies, Stanley Cavel/ frequently writes as though the actors were not
tools of an artist but rather real people speaking and behaving without premeditation.

p rform
ntially the ame act; all are just basically
great torytellers in touch with universal issues common
to all epoch . Mast tells us less, therefore, about the
relation of the given artist to the art and thought of an
age-why a Hawks in particular chose certain of these
i ue to deal with in this particular way. Mast means us
to take Hawk seriously as a cultural figure; he makes a
point of noting that Hawks was friends with "two of the
greate t American literary minds of his age," Hemingway and Faulkner, and that therefore "it seems quite
probable that those minds accepted Hawks as 'one of
us."' But this scarcely locates Hawks within the larger
scheme of twentieth-century thought- that is, in the
kind of scheme in which we are accustomed to locating
figures like Hemingway and Faulkner.
Of course, any number of studies are published on
Hemingway and Faulkner without explicit reference to
intellectual history. But it is taken for granted that as
serious writers, Hemingway and Faulkner are intellectual history. Actually Mast's argument lacks nothing in
itself, but we do miss the more explicit connections to
intellectual culture given that film art has not yet been
accepted as self-evidently a part of that culture. However seriously Mast himself takes movies, it is not clear
that his approach will convince academics outside film
study to do so.
Perhaps Mast, who was trained in serious literature
but has come to teach and write mainly about film, is
not the sort of critic to perform this service. And of
course we also cannot count on scholars like Panofsky,
who leave their established fields only for brief forays
into film. Perhaps the best hope would be a scholar who
stayed within an established discipline but also made a
sustained study of film from that discipline's perspective. We have just such a figure in Stanley Cavell, a
Harvard philosopher who writes with equal facility and
interest about Wittgenstein and the Cary Grant/Katherine Hepburn screwball comedy. Cavell is able to bring
to bear on the latter the profoundest philosophical insights gleaned from studying the former, and the result
is criticism that makes movies sound like very serious
documents indeed.
For Cavell, to talk about Howard Hawks is to talk not
only (as for Mast) about Shakespeare, but also about
Kant, Nietzsche, Freud, Hume, Locke, and Matthew
Arnold, not to mention empiricism, New Comedy, and
"the worldhood of the world"-and very possibly in
just that order. To talk film, in fact, is to do philosophy.
Cavell advocates more rigorous "readings" than are
usually done of the "low" or "typical" instances of film
art (i.e. Hollywood), not just for their own ake but al o
because the importance of movie in our live , and the
fact that intellectuals and other folks care about movie
in similar way , are them elve phenomena that de erv
October, 1983

explaining. Cavell proposes not just to bring Heidegger
into the film curriculum but, when discussing Heidegger, to bring Buster Keaton before the faculty of
philosophy:
My juxtaposition of Kant and Capra [a popular studio director of the
Thirties and Forties] is meant to suggest that you cannot know the
answer to the question of worthwhileness in advance of your own
experience. not the worthwhileness of Capra and not that of Kant. . ..
I am not, in the case of Capra, simply counting on our capacity for
bringing our wild intelligence to bear on just about anything. say
our capacities for exploring or improvi ~ation. What we are to see is
the intelligence that a film has already. brought to bear in its making;
and hence perhaps we will think about what improvisation is and
about what importance is.

This essay, gathered with others last year in Cavell's
book Pursuits of Happiness, shows not only his characteristic complexity (Cavell teaching us how to look at films
philosophically in order to permit them to teach us how
they should be looked at in order to confirm what philosophy teaches us about looking at things, etc.); it also
indicates what connecting film with serious thought
loses for Cavell in terms of the idea of film as erious
art. The reference to Capra notwithstanding, Cav 11
tends as much as Panofsky to suppre s the role of the
artist in his discussions of movies. It is "the film" that
brings intelligence to bear, just as he often speaks of "the
film's preoccupations" or "the world of the film."
In analyzing movies Cavell frequently writ a
though the actors were not tools of an arti t but rath r
real people speaking and behaving without prem ditation. (Indeed, Cavell's theoretical writings tr
the
capacity of film to make us invi ible ob crver of v nt .)
Pursuits of Happiness is a "genre" tudy; Cav ll ee · th
films it discusses as indeed r fleeting th · riou i u
of a given time and culture, and in thi r p t h
specific about cultural hi tory in th way that
rald
Mast isn't. But Cavell pays for thi with hi la k of Ma t'
superior insight into the kill and techniqu f th arti t.
In Cavell's handling the veral film by vari u · dir tors become almost on up r-film , ·in
a h i
expressing the same t of cultural on rn · qually a ·
well as the other . Cavell ha admitt d that it am a
"a clarifying shock to realiz that film w r dir t d '
at all when the auteuri t fir t mad a p int of thi fa t.
"I certainly felt rebuked form ba h ardn s · in ha in r
grown to fatherhood without r all kn " ing wh r
movie came from. " But th h k, in t ad f m
him to take up an int r t in film auth r , I d
rather to mull ov r th qu ti n f what it i ab
that allo" d
p pl
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It is fine to study film artists' works as folk icons, artifacts, epiphenomena, or universal truths,
but in other arts this has been done with the stature of those artists first assumed and assured.

about any mental artifact of Western man, simply because the things they thought about and said inform all
of our thinking. Cavell's basic assumption-and here the
philosophers among us might recall that he has studied
Wittgenstein-resembles a view quite popular in this
century, which has seen sophisticated theories applied
to every kind of mental product from billboards to nursery rhymes to psychotic fantasies.
Whatever their differences with Cavell in some higher
realm of theory, which there is no need to get into here,
essentially this same view lies behind the film ~riticism
done in recent years under various "schools" or rubrics
-linguistic and semiotic, structuralist, psychoanalytic,
Marxist, feminist. On the surface, critics of these schools
take the critical task seriously to the point of being
humorless or even reproachful. Their aim may be a
"scientific" analysis of film, or, what for them is often
the same thing, a singularly rigorous application to
movies of a particular philosophy like Marx's or Freud's.
But even when the result is not stilted "technese" or
jargon-ridden orthodoxy, in the hands of such critics
film tends to remain an artifact instead of an art. And
not necessarily (as for Cavell) a socially beneficial artifact at that: the filmmaker is as likely to turn up in such
criticism as a henchman of sexual repression, patriarchal
dominance, the bourgeoisie, or all of these at onceanything but as an individual whose vision of life demands careful study in terms of its evolution and destiny.

III
I have tried to stress that each of these critics means
to take movies seriously, and each has contributed worthily to what ultimately could be a really serious perspective on the subject. But there is a difference between
being serious about something and taking it seriously.
Swift was hardly serious in "A Modest Proposal," though
he took the plight of Ireland very seriously; and on the
other hand, as suggested above, a serious analysis of
something like a TV commercial can be (and maybe
must be) done by someone who would not for a moment
take seriously the advertiser's claims. This is why, even
though the serious criticism of any art is the sum of
various methods and attitudes much like those described above, we cannot yet say that the , various approaches taken toward film add up- to a situation in
which intellectual culture takes film seriously.
With film a crucial premise, implicit in even the narrowest critical study of the "serious" arts, is still lacking.
We will not be able to say that intellectual culture really
takes film seriously until it comes to treat film art as part
of itself, like other arts. And for this to happen scholars
must admit filmmakers, the best ones anyway, to mem-
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bership in that cultur mu t a rd filmm k r th
same status that the greate t arti t
times scholar them el e ar ac rd d a r at r and
not just reflectors of cultural hi tory. For tart r thi
will mean taking a eriou inter t a
rald Ma t do ,
in filmmakers' actual idea but furthermore in how th y
get those ideas. Whether the an w r lie in int llectual
or psychological biographie or imply in th book
they've read, this question will have to be a ked about
filmmakers as explicitly as it ha long been asked about
poets and novelists. 3 It is fine to break down and study
artists' works as folk icons, artifacts, epiphenomena, or
universal truths, but in other arts this has been done
with the stature of those artists first assumed and assured
-a condition that has not yet been met in the case of
film artists.
A final factor that illustrates as well as aggravates the
low status of film is, of course, the university curriculum.
Film remains less well-established in the curriculum
than is usually supposed. It is only slowly moving
through the stage that literary study endured a hundred
years ago, when it was not universally agreed that literary judgments could be kept intellectually serious
or that literature even constituted the "collective biography of the national mind." According to John Gross,
literature had to be "smuggled" into universities disguised as philology, 4 and today we often see film study
come in disguised as linguistics (or semiotics). Film
study has not reached what Gross calls the stage of "full
trade-unionization" that English literature had achieved
by 1925, but rather is still practiced even in academe by
"men of letters" (and a modern equivalent, the practicing filmmaker) who are segregated from the "real"
disciplines in "schools of the arts." (Andrew Sarris, with
no more than a B.A., holds forth from a full professorship in such a school as Columbia. 5 ) And where it is in
the hands of genuine academics, as at the University of
Chicago, film is not regarded institutionally with the
same seriousness as established studies. One could hard3

An example of this, but obviously not a very characteristic or influential one, is Raymond Durgnat's discussion in The Strange Case of
Alfred Hitchcock (MIT Press, 1974) of possible Jansenist influences
in Hitchcock's childhood. There have also been useful discussions by
critics of, say, Zen influences on Japanese directors or Swedish Lutheranism's on Bergman. but then foreign filmmakers have been taken
more seriously from the beginning, since critics have the advantage
of distance.

4

Gross's discussion of "Early English" in The Rise and Fall of the Man
of Letters (Penguin, 1973) suggests all sorts of parallels with modern
film study-as when Gross notes the special resistance by Oxbridge
to English lit. : "Everything about the subject was suspect: it was
modern. it was enticing, it was bound to be the softest of soft options."
5 Th
·
·
e s1tuat10n
may be different in , say . France, where historically
closer connections between film and intellectual culture have often
been noted. In any case , the problem of professors with B.A.s will be
resolved by the year 2000 when one-third the population of the Western world holds the Ph .D.
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We can only expect film to come into its own when some filmmaker arises whom the intellectual
world regards with the greatest seriousness, initially for reasons having nothing to do with film.

1 gradual fr m the Engli h department, which harb r film tudy at Chicago, without studying a novel,
p m, and play from each major literary period, but
b th ur and exam requirements permit students to
tak th Ph.D. without once looking at a film.
u h in titutional attitudes undoubtedly contribute
to th la k of eriousness my fellow students, at least,
bring to movie , and presumably an institutional change
in thi re ard would have a corresponding effect on
sherry-hour chitchat. But such change itself will be
tardy or ineffectual without a solution to the original
problem, the attitude toward film of intellectual culture
a a whole. We are till left with the question, When will
movie really be taken seriously? It seems to me that
there are three conditions under which they might be,
hence three ways for movies to achieve first-class citizenship among the arts.
One way (alas, the most likely) is for film as we know
it to die out under the onslaught of, say, home video, as
some now predict will happen. This would relegate
film to the past, neutralize its cultural vitality, and so
make it suddenly respectable. It is the same principle
according to which classical and Continental authors
could be seriously studied before English, and European filmmakers before American - since the former in
each case enjoyed what John Gross calls "the academically privileged status of foreigners."
The second and far less likely possibility is that film
study be legitimized by some unimpeachable weight of
authority, some Great Teacher whose word becomes
orthodoxy on a wide range of subjects. It will not do
simply to have a Marx or a Freud whose teachings are
applied after the fact to every sort of subject including
film; I have indicated what sort of polemics that kind of
thing tends to give us. Rather, to legitimize film this
Great Teacher will have to explicitly affirm its value.
What we need is a Plato who, while banishing poets,
demands to keep movies in his Republic; or at least a
Socrates who will pose the question, "We have films, do
we not?" (Gorgias: "Indeed, Socrates. Seen any good
ones lately?") A modern Aristotle penning a De Cinematica might suffice where simply another Cavell or
Panofsky cannot. But to say this is also to indicate why
it will not happen. Aristotle was inventing disciplines;
in today's climate of specialization new studies must
compete at a disadvantage with those already established, and in this match authority naturally weighs in
against film study. There will be no Aristotle for film
because there will be no more Aristotles, and even if
there were, it is not clear that film could resist being
digested by the Cavellian deep-meanings-are-everywhere assumption that comes so easily to the modern
mind.
The last po sibility may be the most unlikely and yet
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paradoxically, the only one worth hoping for as a practical matter. If Aristotelian authority has disintegrated,
well, by virtue of that very fact the modern world nourishes all the more its cult of individual genius. Relying
on this fact, we can expect film to come into its own when
some filmmaker arises whom the intellectual world regards with the greatest seriousness, initially for reasons
having nothing to do with film. This will have to be such
a creative mind as the world has never before seen. It
cannot simply be a minor intellectual working in Hollywood (like Terence Malick), nor a popular filmmaker
with an intellectual bent (like Stanley Kubrick), nor an
important artist making the occasional offbeat film (like
Samuel Beckett), nor even such an artist writing "serious" scripts for popular films (like Harold Pinter). No,
to get movies taken seriously there must emerge a figure
whose career in film is no accident, whose success at
producing and directing locks in his Hollywood credentials, and who in altogether separate artistic/intellectual endeavor attains at least the stature of a T.S.
Eliot. (This because of my sense that an artist or thinker
must rise at least to this status for the cult of genius to
come into full play.) The films of this individual will
initially be pored over for the same rea~ons that the
letters, diaries, grade-school notebooks and other relics
of geniuses are. But the hope is that the very fact of a
genius having taken mass-market Hollywood movies
seriously as a medium for personal expres ion will
finally impress itself enough on all the archivi t , text
editors, dissertation-writers, and other academic traincarriers and true believers to get the point aero .
I say "the hope," although the ble ing will ur ly b
mixed. As I said at the beginning, it is certainly pos ible
to find today's robust interest in movie encouraging in
its very lack of seriousnes . A hundred year ago literature likewise permeated culture and wa activ ly di cussed; one recent commentator ha n.ot d th parall 1
between the way film are talk d about o ially today
and the way Victorian gentlemen c uld all b xp t d
to read and talk about the ame book . It i n t 1 ar that
"serious" literature ha mad an advan by b ming
the province of speciali t . p cialized di u ion i what
weighs down ocial gathering . Int 11 tual n d p pular culture a a realm of thing about whi h th y p rmit themselve and each other to p ak with ut d mantling badge of xp rti . It would b a ham if
movie could not b taken ri u I \ ith ut takin
11 all "th burd n f

for wi <lorn on upennan III, and wh n
movi no lon r li n up th part .
w 11 h oray f r H 11 ,,; d.
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A New Assignment for a Traditional Discipline

Computers and the Future of Music Education
Keith Paulson-Thorp

Our culture seems to be perpetually locked into "revolutions," but it is hard to imagine a revolution more
compelling and complete than the current revolution
in computer technology. New hardware is developed
with dizzying speed, and with equal speed becomes
obsolete. As musicians, many of us like to feign ·immunity to the encroachment of modern civilization, yet
the day of reckoning cannot be far off. With computers
becoming commonplace even in grade schools, and with
the challenges of retrenchment forcing most of us to
broaden our perspectives, it is no longer reasonable to
plan curricula for future generations of musicians and
music educators without consideration of this burgeoning technology.
Computers have already made strong inroads in
many music departments. Their effectiveness in streamlining administrative procedures has enticed even
smaller and more conservative departments to install
computers for records keeping and word processing.
More moderate (or better endowed) departments explore methods of administering examinations and drills
using computers, and at the larger universities use of
computers for music composition is a well-established
mode of research.
Computer applications in music composition have
been available for more than a quarter-century. Two
strikingly divergent, yet not mutually exclusive, approaches are found. Some composers have sought to
employ computers for the calculation of complex compositional algorithms. In particular, computers afford
the composer a much greater precision in determining
the probability of particular events occuring in a composition. The precompositional calculations required
of the composer can be significantly reduced. One of
the first, and most famous, examples of this approach
was Lejaren Hiller and Leonard Isaacson's 1957 Illiac
Suite for string quartet. The details of the score were

Keith Paulson-Thorp is Assistant Professor of Music Theory
and Composition at the University of Southwestern Louisiana,
Lafayette. He holds a D.M.A. from the University of Illinois
and is the author of The Contemporary Harpsichord: A
Guide for Performers and Composers, soon to be released under the aeg£s of the Southeastern Histori'cal Keyboard Society.
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generated on the Illiac computer at th
niversity of
Illinois, Urbana. Unlike in later compositional procedures employing computer calculations, uch a the
renowned "stochastic" music of Iannis Xenaki , in the
Illiac Suite stylistic restraints were not prescribed by
the programmer, but were generated randomly by the
computer.
Many composers have felt that relegation of detail to
the operations of a computer is a rejection of a necessary compositional responsibility and have chosen to
concern themselves more with computer generation of
sounds than with computer generation of compositional
programs. For years, the sounds attainable from a computer lacked the depth and versatility of those generated by analog synthesizers (such as those manufactured
by Moog, Buchla, etc.), but there is no longer reason to
expect that computers in the year 2000 will not be capable of producing with stunning precision virtually any
sound imaginable. While the programs required for
good sound generation are almost prohibitively complex, as the state of the art develops even this obstacle
can be expected to disappear.
Obviously, composers constitute only a fraction of
the music community. Performers have become interested in computer technology as a means of real-time
sound generation. This development has been much
slower in coming than have compositional applications.
It was, in the past, necessary to store a music either in
the form of a program stored in computer memory to
be entered at a terminal, or one to be realized in final
form and stored on magnetic tape. Such canned versions of music leave little space for performer interaction. By the end of the current year, several companies will have taken strides to remove this obstacle
with the introduction of two Apple-compatible systems,
Alpha Syntauri and Soundchaser, and one manufactured by Commodore for its computers. These hardware modules entail multivoice keyboards (with up to
sixteen voices) which operate in conjunction with computer control terminals. The computer, with its phenomenal sophistication of control capability and memory, will be as accessible to performers as are the
portable analog synthesizers that have proliferated in
the popular music market during the past decade.
While the applications cited above may affect the
activities of composition and performance, they do not
directly affect music education. While the tools might
be different, the tasks involved are the same types of
The Cresset

Some researchers have suggested that the understanding of how our minds process information
as abstract as that involved in music listening may be the key to artificial intelligence itself.

mu i al a tiviti
with which we have always dealt,
nam ly n tru tion, labeling, and exe,::ution. As such,
th
han
implied are uperficial, for if computer
te hnology i to have a ignificant impact on music as a
whol , it mu t have some contribution to make to the
way in which we understand a piece of music and the
way in which we educate others to understand music.
The mo t far-reaching implications of computer application in music may come in the area of instruction,
and from insights garnered in research into artificial
intelligence. Some researchers have gone so far as to
ugge t that the understanding of how our minds process
information as abstract as that involved in music listening may be the key to artificial intelligence itself.
At present, the field of computer-assisted instruction
in music is at an embryonic stage. There are several
reasons for this. The first concerns the complexity of
programs required for the generation of musical sounds
and music graphics. While this complexity has attracted
many computer enthusiasts with its challenge, it has
been necessarily limited in the degree of complexity of
musical examples produced. Another problem is more
fundamental, and concerns the lack of precision with
which most musicians approach the intellectual processes of their craft and the inability of theorists to develop and implement realistic models of musical competence from which experimental programs might be
developed.
Many larger computer firms have developed programs to assist in music instruction. Some of these companies have focused on the design of self-contained and
highly specialized units. One of the most impressive of
these machines is the Exercette computer manufactured
in Canada. In place of the standard typewriter (ASCII)
keyset, the Exercette is equipped with a touch-sensitive
grid and a small LED read-out. The student places a
cardboard screen over the grid, which identifies the
functions performed by the remaining grid areas. The
tasks which a student may attempt involve most of the
simpler cognitive skills stressed in the first year or two
of a college ear-training curriculum, skills such as elementary interval recognition, chord quality and short
chord progression identification, etc. A few more complex chord structures, such as dominant and diminished seventh chords, are included as the student progresses. The sound quality of the machine, though
obviously electronic, is quite adequate and the example
played sound clearly and recognizably.
The Exercette is very u eful in the flexibility of pacing
it allows. A student may a k to have an example r peated as many times a necessary, and for harmonic
examples he may at any time reque t to have the tonic
chord sounded for the key in which the exampl i
functioning. Such repetition may prove annoying to
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more advanced students in a classroom situation, but
on an individual basis, they can reduce frustration and
improve confidence for less gifted students.
The drawbacks of the Exercette are common to most
essays in music instruction. While the examples may,
in themselves, be of general practical value, it is impossible for the computer to simulate an actual listening
experience. The discontexted and isolated nature of the
exercise may preclude the transference of skills developed to more realistic contexts. In traditional eartraining, for example, professors have often found that
students become so accustomed to the sound of dictation played at the piano that the students' success factor
drops alarmingly when they are asked to identify structures played on other instrument . Even if a stud nt
can recognize short examples at a computer, there i
no guarantee that he will recognize the sam tructure
embedded in a Mozart symphony.
Second, while the student may be learning to apply
labels and visual forms to sound structur , he i not
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we do not demand precision of thought from our students (and from ourselves) when speaking
about music, how can we reasonably expect logical decisions regarding interpretation to ensue?
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puter. While most of pple' comp titor have retain d
licen ing and marketing right for compatible oftwar
Apple ha allowed compatible oftware for their computers to develop on an open market thu taking advantage of an abundance of creativity at large. umerous companies now specialize in various pple-compatible softwares (the most notable of the e for musicians being Micro Music Inc.), and several universities
have developed exceptional Apple-compatible software
which may be available for distribution in the near
future. Such flexibility is not without its price, however,
for Apple has remained comfortably aloof from the
recent price wars that have brought the cost of home
computers within the budget of the masses. A single
Apple terminal with the necessary disk module, display
module, etc. will run at least two thousand dollars. Considering, however, that the Exercette is in the same price
range but without the flexibility of the Apple system,
this is not really out of line.
Most of the software available from these larger companies involves the same basic cognitive tasks available
on the self-contained units as well as tasks dealing with
vocabulary identification (particularly of foreign terms),
and even programs which enable the user to devise
elementary tunes. While one might be easily impressed
with the sophistication of the graphics and sound available in this software, one must still wonder if there is
not more that computers may be able to offer musicians.
The ultimate determination of how we may wish
computers to contribute to music education will hinge
on our ability to discern more precisely how it is that
humans learn to interpret musical information. Until
we know how the musical mind is programmed, we will
not be able to program computers to assist in any truly
efficient way. Such concerns would have seemed totally
irrelevant only a few decades ago. We have usually been
content to churn out musical sounds and scores and to
label them with much the same mindless alacrity as that
with which a butcher might stuff and market sausages.
The success of our endeavors depends largely on the
snob appeal our services may afford and on the mystical
aura in which we so carefully enshroud our work.
The president of a major New York conservatory recently claimed that the job of his institution was to teach
students to do, not to enjoy, music. Such insistence on
music as a physical rather than a mental activity is rampant, and is ultimately stifling to music as an art. It is
arguable, moreover, that people seldom excel at those
things which they do not enjoy, and that they seldom
enjoy those things which they are unable to understand.
The interpretation of sounds as music, after all, occurs
in the brain, where musical sounds are detached from
the larger body of current perceptions and filtered
through our individual repertoires of remembered
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completely delet d at man chool w mu t find way
of drawing music into the larger p trum of human
understanding and of re torin academic r p tability
within the profes ion.
A representative of a major computer firm r cently
remarked that his company's intere t in the development and marketing of music software was imped d by
the fact that musicians them elve could not agree on
important issues. As a result, programs are u ually restricted to those which deal with more absolute components such as interval and triad quality identification.
Unfortunately, much music education fails ever to go
beyond these lower level processes. This avoidance of
intellectual concepts arises from the general opinion
offered above that such concepts are not germane to
music (or that musicians are not mentally equipped to
handle difficult concepts) and is then evidenced by a
lack of precision in musical terminology. Precision by
no means implies that we must adopt a universally acceptable vocabulary, but rather that terms, when they
are employed, must be carefully defined for a given
application. In order to function logically, a definition
must be of the form "A if and only if B" where reciprocity is explicit. Musicians often allow sets of attributes or
circumstances to function as definitions.
For example, while works which might be categorized as "artistic" may evoke an emotional response, it is
not true that all things which elicit emotional responses
are "artistic" in nature. Sufficient data has not been
expounded to create a definition, and the criterion of
emotional response cannot adequately serve to define
what is meant by "artistic." Such meaningless usages
abound in musical parlance. If we do not demand precision of thought from our students (and from ourselves) when speaking about music, how can we reasonably expect logical decisions regarding interpretation
to ensue? Too often musical decisions are rooted in the
assumption that if things have always been done, or
seem to have been done, in a given manner then they
must necessarily always be done in that manner. Reevaluation of traditional approaches is not attempted.
Precision of terminology can open for students new
modes of thought and inquiry which will expand their
musical perspectives and stimulate creative approache
to listening and performance. Students can be challenged to question the way they have labeled and examined musical structure in the pa t.
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Those who are able to think and make decisions rationally, rather than on the basis of
primitive reactions, will be the ones who will carry the music profession into the next century.
T rminology i but the tip of the iceberg, for prei i n f thought r quire not only a finely honed vocabulary but al o a olid foundation in logic. In music,
mor than on logical sy tern i required if we are to
und r tand what we are doing. While classical truthfunctional logic may apply in the manner in which we
define and apply terminology, there is much evidence
to ugge t that logical modalities (i.e., necessity/possibility, obligation/ permission , etc.) are required to explain the manner in which we actually make sense of
music in time. What is needed is a music curriculum
which combines the essentials of music with the essentials of logic, and which demonstrates the close correlation between the two. A pioneering effort in this direction has been made possible by the recent work of Jos
Kunst at the Utrecht Institute for Sonology. Kunst, in
his treatise Making Sense in Music (Utrecht, 1978), has
developed a methodology for applying logical modalities to the analysis of musical processing. His theory
has the advantage of being able to incorporate analytical
procedures specific to virtually any harmonic, rhythmic,
or melodic system. Kunst's ideas may eventually lift
musical thought out of the quagmire of more popular
Schenkerian and set-theory approaches to music that
have consistently reached dead ends.
There are two ways in which computers may assist
us in attaining this desired fusion of materials. The first
approach would delegate the teaching of basic labeling
tasks to computer-assisted instruction, thus removing
from professors the burden of dealing with black and
white concepts and freeing them for more concentration on the application of logical processes in actual
works of music. The realization of this approach would
be in sight only if the majority of college teachers would
be willing to retrain. The second approach would
patently incorporate logically-based concepts within
computer-assisted instruction . By this method a more
standardized approach would result which might avoid
some of the difficulties created when professors are illequipped to deal with intrinsically non-musical materials. Computers, moreover, have the advantage of
being able to respond interactively to individual problems, and of offering enlightening commentary when a
mistake is made, in a way that is difficult to ensure in a
classroom situation. Each student's progress and areas
of weakness can be closely monitored and recorded.
Obviously, if we are to develop software which will
fuse music, logic, and related sciences into a cohesive
whole, we cannot leave sole responsibility for program
design in the hands of computer specialists, but must
diversify into those areas ourselves. We have long been
willing to accept the formulations of amateur mu ician ,
many of whom have not had sufficient experience to
have disposed of naive preconceptions, while we it idly
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by. We should be able to expect that those who write
music commentary and music-oriented computer programs have adequate training. We must likewise not
permit ourselves to delve into complementary fields
without adequate preparation, even when those fields
become indispensible to our own work. Courses in logic,
mathematics, acoustics, and computer science must become a standard part of a music educator's training.
Music majors tend to be a xenophobic lot, jealously
guarding what they perceive to be the uniqueness of
their art and resisting the temptation to explore. Music
is one of the few majors where a minor outside of the
principle field is not required. Because of the enormous
load of courses required for most music degrees, there
would be little time for development in other disciplines
even if a student were so inclined. When courses in the
sciences are required, students are left to choose from a
bewildering array, not knowing which courses might be
most pertinent to their major field. What is worse, most
departments have designed courses to provide nonmajors with a painless fulfillment of general requirements. Seldom are these classes worthwhile. If the
sciences were introduced in a meaningful way as part
of the music curriculum, students might be better prepared to select the most useful course in fulfilling their
general requirements. In addition, we might find means
for preparing students for a wider variety of care r
possibilities in a discipline which merciles ly pigeonholes those who enter it, and which ha long suffered
from a shortage of jobs.
If computers cannot pose a complete olution to th
problem of curricular integration in music, th y at
least present some interesting option as weJ 1 a th
opportunity to try new direction . In ·olving xi ting
problems, new ones invariably ari e and hallenging
solutions are demanded. The rapid acceleration f thi ·
cycle in music is not unprecedent d , but it i
rtainly
unusual.
In adapting education to the wave · of futur ~ ·tud nt ·
who will have been weaned on comput r t hnology,
the greatest challenge i to tho of u wh mu t urselves, after years of tudying mu ·i , b om ·tud nt
once more in foreign discipline . In a pting thi hallenge, we may be better pr par d to hall ng our tudents to train th ir mind a w 11 a th •i r fing r . \:
a h tud nt t
tu at

n xt entury.
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CamDiary

The Reformation
Persona Iity
Richard Lee
A sabbatical happily allows a little
time for reading outside one's field,
so I recently read my University's
catalog from cover to cover. As one
of my Cambridge students had cautioned me, it is everything you ever
wanted to know about Valparaiso
University but were afraid to ask.
On the last page is this provocative
statement summing up all that we
are and are doing:
. a growing and maturing private University of academic excellence operating
within the Lutheran tradition , whose purpose is the deve lopment of an effective
Christian personality that will leave its
mark throughout society.

Setting aside slight problems of syntax, the statement seems to me unexceptionable. I find nothing amiss
in the University having psychological designs upon its students as long
as it is frank and open about what is
obviously a dangerous business, the
"development" of other people's
personalities. Such a statement, however, must be followed by the most
important question ever asked within the Lutheran tradition- the venerable ca't echetical question "What
does this mean?"
That there is a "Christian personality" appropriate to 'the Lutheran
tradition" I have no doubt. I also
think it exceedingly difficult to say
what that personality is, much le s
what an "effective" one might be.
22

But if difficult qu ti n
on worth a kin th n the qu ti n
of the R formation per nalit i
urely worth meditatin(T on in thi
month'
abbatical diary b the
gentle River Cam.
ear the 500th anniver ary of hi
birth, I think it no di credit to Luther to ay at once that his per onality is not the per onality we mean,
partly because hi personality i o
embedded in late medievalism but
mo tly because no one per on can
be the type of the Reformation personality. It has long been a consolation of the Lutheran tradition that
one need not be like Luther to be
Lutheran. Our question seeks a type,
not an historical model.
The answer likely lies in what the
Reformation did to the very conditions of personhood. Like it or not,
the Reformation uprooted personhood grounded in the natural, tribal, semi-Pelagian religion of the
late medieval world. When one visits
the monuments and artifacts of that
world here in England, for example,
one is struck by how commonsensical and communal that religious
world must have been for each person. His apparent virtue was confirmed, his apparent vice shriven,
and a whole community, including
a sacramental God, could help pull
him through his life toward the salvation of his soul. Perhaps no doctrine sums up the situation of medieval personhood better than the gentle doctrine of purgatory. Even beyond death a person could be helped
by his family, the Blessed Virgin,
and all the saints. In life and death
you never walked alone, and the
religious demands upon you were
always more or less tolerably within
your means and those of your community.
The Reformation countered these
commonsensical and communal
conditions of per onhood and set
each person more individually before God and under the mo t awesome claims concerning both the
depths of his in and the grace of
God in Christ for him. It i a if each
person were natched out of the
choru to sing olo or plucked from

him lf.
Luth r p ibl
r tat
th
ca for a hri tian' cl ath (lik hi
bapti m) i
till don within th
whole ch ring compan
f heaven
and be id Chri t going b fore him
but the individual accountability of
each oul before God cannot be
denied a the religiou ly con tituent
part of the Reformation p r onality.
That personality i grounded sola
upon the audacious Reformation
claims concerning both the absolute
judgment and the total grace of God,
and the way of faith for each soul is
now necessarily through the crisis of
doubt because of the very audacity
of those claims. The Reformation
upped the ante of personal doubt
even as it raised the bid for personal
faith.
Insofar as religion is one of the
conditions of personhood, the Reformation personality is probably
inclined toward skepticism about
everything short of God Himself,
some distrust of sweet reasonableness, a tendency to see communities
formed by individuals (rather than
the reverse), a disposition to see life
constituted in critical decisions
(rather than process), and a certain
grave joy taken in one's vocation .
We all know the possible aberrations
of this personality type, but given
the range of possible human personalities it is not the worst one. My
University apparently considers
some such personality a desirable
one to develop in its students. Certainly students receive fair warning
that such is the University's purpose,
although everything in the catalog
"is for information only and does
not constitute a contract between the
tudent and the University."
The next question-how the University actually develops such a peronality, particularly so as to "leave
its mark throughout society" would seem to me a que tion to
occupy many mind far better than
mine for a long long time.
Cl
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Television

Women In the News
Christine Craft's Case
Highlights Some Problems
And Hides Some Others
James Combs
Women are in the news. I mean
that in both senses: women are news,
and women in the news are news. In
the former instance, we now have
much discussion-and rightly soabout the attitudinal and electoral
"gender gap" between men and
women. The gender gap is virtually
unprecedented, and it makes politicians uncomfortable because it
introduces yet another joker into the
deck of election returns. Consider
this: in the August national polls,
President Reagan had the approval
rating of about 51 per cent of adult
males, but had dropped eight more
points among women, with only 34
per cent of adult females approving
him.
Males and females seem to divide
sharply on a wide variety of issues.
And women are now more likely
than ever to vote (they are registering in heavy numbers), and to vote
independent of the opinions of significant males (father, husband,
brother) in their lives. Reagan
doesn't help himself with some of
his ill-considered offhand remarks,
but then perhaps no politician could
totally please women activists of
whatever ideological stripe. We are

James Combs, The Cresset 's regular
Television cn:tic, is spending the current
semester as a visiting professor in the
Department of Political Science at the
University of Tennessee.
October, 19&'3

Women are in the news-in more than one sense.
Women are news, and women in the news are news.
simply living in an age of rising expectations among women, and those
expectations-jobs, careers, government services, political recognition,
and vaguer things such as independence and fulfillment- may outrun
the ability of politicians to deliver.
There is even among some women
(on both Right and Left) considerable distrust of all male politicians
(and maybe even of males in general, which I must admit is probably
not totally unwarranted), since they
don't "really understand."
If it is the case that we live in an
age of the politicization of the battle
of the sexes (including homosexual
politics), then we are faced with a
new dimension of the age-old struggle of men and women to understand, get along with, and even in a
few notable cases genuinely to love
each otl~er. Men and women are,
after all, physical and emotional
mysteries to one another, and to the
extent that relationships between
them are complicated by considerations of power, the mystery- and the
alienation- is compounded. I have
recently heard both young women
and young men seriously say that
they doubt that a simple, happy, and
lasting relationship between the sexes
is possible any more: men and women have conflicting and irreconcilable expectations, don't trust each
other, see the other as a threat to
their identity, and so on. Contemporary men, for example, will often
say that they just · don't know what
to expect of women these day ; not
knowing, they shy away, are u picious and uncertain, and fearful of
commitment. Many women may
well experience the same thing. uch
people are ca ualtie in the exual
revolution, victim of hi torical
change in the rol
tru tur
f
society.
till uch p riod of xual rol
redefinition are exciting (if puzzling), invigoratin (if xhau tin )
and probably all in all b n fi ial (if
ometime individuall d tru tiv ).

In historical change, somebody always gets hurt. The victims are
those lonely and confused souls who
don't know any more what to make
of the opposite sex. But there are
also all those bright and suddenly
ambitious women who will make
their mark on the world, and who
have also managed to negotiate
more satisfying relationships with
men. Since times of abrupt change
aren't easy, it is quite understandable that people split badly over
what should be done, both individually and socially. If individual men
and women can't work out their differences (over, for example, household duties), imagine how hard it is
to get any consensus on social policy:
abortion, equal rights, political representation - the list is endless.

The basic individual and
political question is, how
should women be treated?
The basic individual and political
question is, how hould women b
treated? One a sum
that mo t
women want to b treat d human ly
and equitably, but that till d n 't
an wer the que tion. nd in
question i under on id rabl
pute, ymbolic ca e ari -in
nversation and th ma m diawhich illu trat th onfli t and th
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The most obvious dilemma for news stations involves their freedom to fire or
demote newspersons if they become unpopular or, for that matter, simply older.
will recall, is the television newswoman who was demoted at KMBCTV in Kansas City because the mvners, a media conglomerate called
Metromedia, did audience surveys
which concluded that she was frumpily dressed, opinionated, and lacked
"warmth and comfort"; the station's
news director told her she was "unattractive, too old, and not deferential to men" (presumably those on
the show). She sued, contending
that she was hired for her journalistic skills, not her sex appeal, youth,
fashionability, or feminine deference to the male "leaders" on the
news show. She won, gaining
$500,000 in damages, $375,000 of
which was back pay. She had made
a convincing case that Metromedia
had hired her under false pretenses,
had practiced sex discrimination,
and had violated equal pay laws.
How far-reaching the case will be,
both in the media industry and without, is unclear, and there may be
appeals. But the Craft case causes
much handwringing and reflection.
The most obvious dilemma for
news stations involves their freedom
to fire or demote newspersons if they
become unpopular or, for that matter, simply older. The Craft case
reminds us that TV news is cosmetic
in several senses, not the least of
which is that the news is usually read
by pretty faces, male as well as female. Flip around the channels in
competitive media markets, and
look at all that blow-dried hair,
those cleft and youthful male chins,
squared shoulders, and athletic
builds: how many ugly men do you
see on local news programs? Or
think of all those stand-ups before
a Minicarµ at city hall, an accident,
or a political rally by all those young
women who look like they just
stepped out of the pages of Glamour
magazine. Some are the graduates of
journalism schools, some not; some
are intelligent, some not; some are
competent, some not; but nearly all
are photogenic, and groomed for the
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part. To speak of "journalistic kills"
in a visual entertainment medium i
almost ludicrous, given the tate of
the art-and the audience-of TV
news. The Craft case was, to be sure,
a particularly blatant one, but not
atypical of what TV news is all about.
Unlike Craft, most TV newswomen
- and newsmen- are willing to play
the game according to the conventional rules.
The game is both a lucrative and
glamorous one for those who play it
well. Craft's back pay should give
us some clue, but listen to this: local
TV news and weather people in
large media markets are paid more
than Presidents, more than the
heads of many large corporations,
more, even, than their own bosses
at the station or company. Half a
million dollars and more a year is
not uncommon for anchors at such
stations. Yet the stations contend
that it's worth it: getting the right
"formula" for TV news in Houston,
Chicago, or New York means millions in advertising revenue. Metromedia clearly had something other
than journalistic skills in mind
when it wanted Christine Craft to
groom her appearance. That such
practices are sexist (it works both
ways: handsome men attract female
viewers) is indisputable; but then
that wouldn't be the first time that
greed won out over humane, or even
professional, values. In such a cynical and manipulative world, the
ethical question that women, and
men, are nagged with is, what am I
willing to do for money, fame,
power, and ambition? How do I retain my integrity in a world of cosmetic values? How should I be
treated?
It is true that TV news practices
are counter-balanced by other factors, such as the constant criticism
they get (from such as me) for the
frivolous and idiotic aspects of news
programming. But remember the
dilemma they are in: no matter what
the law, critics, or journalism school

rhetoric a
h y ar till tu k with
attracting and holdin an audi n
that may not hare the value and
concern of elites. Th ystem doe
not alway work again t women's
interest . There are a lot more women in TV news now than there used
to be becau e people want to see
women deliver the news. Local stations, for example, have dramatically increased the number of women
anchors over the past decade; women now routinely cover the big network beats (the White House, the
State Department); and more women than ever before get sent out on
important and dangerous assignments. And how many local stations
still have weather girls?
The Craft case, then, points up
many of the complications and
choices concerning the treatment of
women in the media business. There
is something else we should remember as well. The Craft case illustrates the extent to which TV news is
concerned with itself. The mass
media is very self-conscious, aware
of its own power and glamour, and
fascinated by stories that concern
news people. The symbolic drama
of Christine Craft drew much press
and TV coverage (lead stories on
each of the three evening network
shows, discussions on talk shows
among network newswomen, op-ed
columns in major newspapers). And
perhaps Craft does symbolize a victory for female equality.
Yet the coverage given the Craft
story illustrates the very point she
was rebelling against: the extent to
which the mass media will focus on
a story involving elites, involving a
"sexy" (the pun is intended) issue,
involving a symbolic drama about
glamourous people (like Christine
Craft)-celebrities living in the
world of publicity, media values,
and, yes, cosmetics. When celebrities
enact a symbolic drama, we are
given the illusion that the issue is
now resolved, that now sexist or imply unfair treatment of women at
The Cresset

The handsome people you see on TV news occupy a
very different world from the wretched of the earth.
work will end. The ca e of Chri tine
Craft fa cinate the new media, but
what do it have to do with the lives
of ordinary women?
It i likely that mo t women who
work, on or off camera, in the major
media organizations in this country
are in favor of female equality and
fair treatment. But from my point
of view, the Craft case obscures the
real issues concerning American
women, diverting our attention
from the problems that beset ordinary folks. Most women- like most
men- are indeed ordinary, and are
beset with the mundane concerns of
the uncelebrated world-scratch1.ng
out a living, raising the kids, getting
adequate day care, working at two
jobs, putting up with spouses and
ex-spouses. The great inequality of
local, and in some measure, network
TV news is not gender, it is class:
there simply is very little coverage
of the people on the bottom. The
"class gap" means, for one thing,
·that the problems of minority and
poor women get little coverage. Are
largely middle-class audiences, and
the people who create the news, just
not interested in the problems of,
say, Chicano women working in
sweat shops for starvation wages in
El Paso? Probably.
The cheerful and handsome people you see on TV news occupy a
very different world from the
wretched of the earth. And they
likely share the conclusion that
media consultants regularly pass on
to local stations: people don't want
too much bad news, and the plight of
women coping with hunger, dispossession, beatings, and unemployment is bad news. So their fellow
women are erased, omitted from the
mediated reality over which they
preside nightly. Media celebrities
such as newswomen are interested
in portraying the problems of women they can understand, o the Craft
case becomes a natural. The problem of an unnamed Chicano woman in El Pao do not. We are unequal
October. 1983

in many ways, including celebrity.
It is likely that women will largely
gain respectful and fairly equal
treatment in the media business in
the years to come, if for no other
reason than that they will focus much
media attention on the problem. But
the real question will be, how much
attention will the women in the
media focus on other women in the
media, and how much will they focus on the vast number of women not
in the media? Which women are
news? In the struggle for female
equality and dignity, who is important? The danger is that classes
of women will be forgotten by the
media contemplating itself as the
center of the universe. Women in
the media are caught up in the star
system, and are in danger of forgetting those "journalistic skills" of
which Craft spoke in favor of a symbolic drama of which the media people themselves are the stars, not
those unnamed millions of women
whose problems and concerns the
media has the responsibility to depict. When ordinary women watch
the news, what do they see of themselves?
Perhaps they do not want to see
themselves, preferring glamourous
women and stories. But if "journalistic" values are important, then does
TV news have the responsibility to
look at the question of how women,
and not just media women, should
be treated? Or are we moving more
and more into the "Ken and Barbie"
school of news reporting, with the
temptation of media narcis ism more
and more yielded to? We shall
But there are already augurie : aft r
winning her ca e, Chri tine raft
announced to the world that h
would now be involved in th production of a made-for-T m i
about her life, with a w 11-kn wn
movie tar already ca t t play h r .
o far a I know th r i n pr du tion und r \ ay in lving a w man
who work in a w at ·hop in I Pa .

Women Who
Shouldn't Exist
How Hard-Won Victories
Get Taken for Granted
Alan Graebner
Like my father, my grandfather,
and my great-grandfather before
me, I teach at a midwestern in titution of higher education. Unlike
them, however, I teach at a Roman
Catholic college for women. What
my great-grandfather, who wa convinced Leo XIII was a threat to
American liberty, and what my
grandfather, who in hi youth al o
taught Minne ota (alb it orw ian
Lutheran) women, would ay ab ut
my situation i omething for which
I await et rnity with fitting pati n e.
In the meantim I p nd mu h of
my profe i nal !if trying t und rtand, and to h lp tud nt · appr ciate, th hi tory of worn n in thi
country.
ery pring t rm w b gin in th arly v nt nth ntury
and by Ma hav
m t th arly
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College for women was unthinkable because people knew that the fairer sex does
not reason, it intuits. Women, it was commonly assumed, do not think; they feel.
19 0 . It i an intere ting four
month this trip through four centuries· neither the cenery nor the
per pective are ever quite the same.
Each year there i more {both cholarship and year ) to get into a term
that stays the same length. My fellow
travelers change as well. A decade
ago I could conclude with a few verbal nods at women's liberation, but
to students born in the year Friedan
wrote the Feminine Mystique, that
and the ew Left have now to be as
carefully explained as the legal system of the colonies.

The female college
students of today
contradict the best
informed expectations of
the nineteenth century.
So I found myself during the concluding week of last spring's term,
puzzling over how I should try to
pull things together for the final
lecture. Appalled at the number of
topics still left untouched, I turned
to the time-honored strategy of trying to define what the students most
needed to know. To do that, of
course, one must define carefully
who the students are.
As I pondered that matter, I suddenly realized they are all wrong,
these students. They are pleasant
women, mostly from middle-class
homes in the Upper Midwest. They
come to class un-selfconsciously
dressed in jeans and shirts. They
are at least mildly interested, polite
and respectful- often too much so.
With varying degrees of efficiency
they take notes during lectures, and
do the readings. We have some discussions that barely get off the
ground, and others that arouse intense participation; but in both
cases rationality is the rule. The
students take the exams and most of
them pass, some brilliantly. Their
grades get posted to their transcripts,
along with grades from all manner
of courses in the sciences as well as
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the art c rtification " h r with to
apply for job and graduate hool.
In late May the tudent with ufficient eniority graduate and go on
the mailing li t of the college alumnae office. In due cour e, mo t of the
alumnae write back with news of
jobs, marriages, and children.
one of this is unique these day .
But by the standards of an earlier
day, all of it is wrong. These women
I teach ought not exist. In practically
every particular I have mentioned,
my students contradict the best informed expectations of the nineteenth century and before. Until
relatively recently, the most respected opinion of the day knew that
the idea of a college-educated woman was ludicrous, and the idea of a
college woman with career more
preposterous still. College for women was unthinkable because people knew that the fairer sex does not
reason, it intuits. Women do not
think; they feel. Women who voluntarily leave the home unsex themselves. They might just as well wear
trousers to prove they are certainly
no longer women. Their hands, feet,
and facial features lose feminine
delicacy. Girls who try to study in
college doom themselves to sterility,
if not permanent invalidism and

Readin
uch opinion , my
dent - tho who by th
p tation ought not
i t-are u ually
more puzzled than outraged· we
are after all no longer in the eventie . The beliefs are o outlandish
that student often try to make ense
of them in ways that I have learned
to warn again t. One way to explain
the ideas i to assume these views
arose from the lunatic fringe; there
have always been crazies who said
bizarre things. But in fact the people
who voiced this advice were sober
folk who pondered the state of society in a concerned and conscientious way. They were the sort of
public-spirited citizens who one day
would read In Luce Tua.
Another way I see some students
treating these opinions is to view
them as comic and thus benign. After all, our great-grandmothers lived
apparently satisfied and productive
lives without access to college. Fortunately historians are allowed a
sense of humor; they may laugh as
well as weep over the misplaced cer-
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Education was not simply novel, but an ominous threat
to the family, the state, and the natural order.
tainti of the pa t. And yet to treat
tho a rtion of the past a benign
i to a um that unle the victim
ream there i no victim. Is not the
employ e who e pension fund is
ecretl y embezzled robbed whether
or not he realizes it?
still more common temptation
i to as ume these people in the past
did not really mean what they were
saying. They were somehow only
actors in a period-piece drama repeating lines given to them. Secretly
they knew better. The naivete of
this interpretation would be charming if it were not so arrogant. Of
course those people in the nineteenth century meant what they
were saying. For them the college
women we take for granted were
inconceivable, not in the sense of
being unimaginable, but in the
sense of being a tragic mistake. To
fail to comprehend that inconceivability is to distort the past, to make
the past into the present, comfortable in its familiarity. And to do
that is to miss important lessons.

A common temptation
is to assume that
people in the past did
not really mean
what they were saying.
One of those lessons is the courageousness of the handful in the
nineteenth century who insisted
women could be, and ought to be,
educated in college just as men
were. They insisted on -the goal
when they had no models and no
proof. They could not point reassuringly to the reality of my students
in the 1980s. All they had was the
principle of justice and the courage
of their convictions. It is not just
that they were operating on faith.
That is often said of pioneers-and
it misses an important dimension
of their actions. These pioneers were
pursuing a course that was not only
untried, but one that the most judicious counsel of their time advised
October, 1983

was a terrible blunder, something
that would ruin individual lives
and society itself. College education
was not simply novel, but an ominous threat to the family, the state,
and the natural order.
Why stress all this? One reason is
to appreciate more fully the heroines we have. Another is because
we, too, live in a time when proposals are being urged to change
the place of women. But what is
being advocated strikes many cautious observers as fraught with peril,
dangerous threats to the family, the
state, and the natural order. Our
society has heard such cautions before. And on education they were
wrong, dead wrong. One might say
laughably wrong, except for the
damage they did to the lives of so
many people.
Do earlier misperceptions make
all current proposals for change
right? Of course not. But when we
find we have assumptions and are
engaged in behavior that our forebears damned unequivocally, passionately, and fearfully, is that not
a lesson as we in turn look to the
future? And does this not suggest
that when we hear proposals conscientiously based on principles of
justice, we ought to respond with
hope and energy, not fear and footdragging?
On occasion, in discussions of
feminism-discussions which tacitly
assume college education for women - I try to explain that what is at
issue is not simply equal pay or
access to careers, but radical redefinitions of what a career is and reformulations of family role . If I am
sufficiently eloquent or the Ii t ner
sufficiently prescient, ther e i ofte n
a long, frowning silence. Then , "but
surely," come the concern ed and
puzzled reply, "feminist
ant b
seriou . That' ju t imp ibl . It
would change our whol
i ty. ''
t that it is my turn for ii n . H w
can I explain about m tud nt wh
ought not exi t ?
Cl
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When the Theatre
Rocked the Cradle

A Thirties Revival
Recalls a Radical Era
John Steven Paul
I
John Houseman designed the
Acting Company's recent revival of
Marc Blitzstein's The Cradle WiJl
Rock to hearken back to the original
production and its circumstanc s.
Houseman produced the original
for the Works Progress Administration's Federal Theatre Project in
1937 with Orson Welles directing.
This spirited revival of th play with
music opened la t spring at New
York's City Center and it national
tour includ d a umm r stop at
Ravinia Park , the picnic pot f r
Chicago' cultural
tabJi hm ent.
The Cradle ha b en alled an
American Threep enny Opera and j f
the Blitz tein work cliff r from th

John t
n aul teach s in th Department of peech and Drama aL alparaiso niver. it and seroes as regu lar
T heatre cn'tic fo r h
t.

27

In Blitzstein's inquiry, Religion, the Press, Education, Medicine-all the
bastions of bourgeois civilization-reveal themselves as habitual prostitutes.
ter Mister. Mister Mister also owns
and runs the lives of the folks who
live in Steeltown, like Moll, a girl
whose blues ballad, "The
ickel
Under The Foot," opens the score.
The economic facts of life in Steeltown permit her to work only two
days a week. In order to eat on the
other five days, Moll turns desperately to prostitution.
Meanwhile, a young union organizer, Larry Foreman, is trying
to wrest the town from Mister Mister
and to give it to the people who live
and make a living there. On one
particular night Foreman and Moll
meet up in night court, he for union
agitating and she for ·soliciting. In
the courtroom, Blitzstein broadens
the conflict by inquiring into the
moral conduct of a number of Steeltown society's pillars. Mister Mister,
it soon becomes clear, does not boss
the town without help, and Moll is
not the only prostitute on the street.
First among those prostituting
themselves for Mister Mister is the
Reverend Salvation. The smarmy
Salvation's sermons have long been
cued to the fluctuations of the international steel market. When in 1916
good business dictated selling armaments to all warring parties in Europe, Salvation preached neutrality
thinly disguised as pacifism. When
joining the war on the side of Britain
and France looked profitable, the
minister's homilies extolled peace
that passes all understanding and
death to the Hun in a war to end all
wars. As long as the Reverend receives his weekly "collection" from
the Misters, the content of his message is entirely malleable.
The Misters have persuaded Reverend Salvation and others of Steeltown's solid citizens to join their
"Liberty Committee" to protect the
town against "union tyranny." Other
members include Editor Daily
whose enforced loyalty to Mister
Mister is a mockery of the freedom
of the press. In order to retain his
publishing privilege, the editor runs
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a slander series against Mi ter Mister's enemy, Larry Foreman. When
Mister Mister needs to round up
anti-union goons he suggests that
President Prexy of College U niversity require two years of military
training of all male students. To
keep his powerful trustee happy, the
president readily agrees to his demands and then finds him a suitable
faculty propagandist for the recruitment rahy. Mister Mister names
Dr. Specialist chairman of the Liberty Committee-an appointment
that wins the physician a prestigious
research position - in return for his
certification that one of Mister Mister's employees, Joe Worker, was
drunk and fell into a ladle of molten
steel. The truth, of course, is that the
employee, who had been campaigning for the union, was pushed.
In Blitzstein's ip.quiry, Religion,
the Press, Education, Medicineall the bastions of bourgeois civilization- reveal themselves as habitual prostitutes. Nor does Art have
any claim to integrity. Yasha and
Dauber, musician and artist respectively, play up to Mrs. Mister's vanity, and she patronizes them in return. Again this year the artists'
grim prospects will force them to
Mrs. Mister's banal but bountiful
weekend salons. When she asks them
to join her husband's Liberty Committee they accept without question.
After all, they sing, we're not politicians, but artists.
And we love art for art's sake
It's smart for art's sake
to part for art's sake
With your heart for art's sake
And your mind for art's sake
Be blind for art's sake
And deaf for art's sake
And dumb for art's sake
Until for art's sake
They kill for art's sake
All the art for art's sake.

But The Cradle Will Rock indicts
the establishment types on more
counts than just prostitution; their
crimes are not victimless. Their collusion with the boss results in in-

ju tic and e ploitati n, in un mploym nt, hunger ill-hou ing. The
Mister and their Lib rty Committee ha e deprived the Joe Worker
of just that their lib rty, and of
other con titutionally-guaranteed
rights such a the pur uit of happiness, and sometimes of life itself. A
closed union shop, according to
Larry Foreman, will restore those
rights to everyone in Steeltown, protect democratic institutions, and
rock the cradle of the Liberty Committee. Blitzstein portrays the choice
between Mister Mister and the
union, between management and
labor, as a choice between fascism
and democracy. The sound of
marching that closes the show testifies to the people's choice, the beginning of Mister Mister's demise.
Even in 1937, in the midst of a
decade that rang with radicalism
(and perhaps because of this), The
Cradle Will Rock sounded dangerously radical. The allegorical, almost cartoonish, nature of the show
does not blunt the edge of its message. Its satire is abrasive; its humor
pointedly ironic. Indeed it is now
no wonder that its producer, the
Federal Government, closed the
show before opening night.

II
The rich and remarkable history
of The Federal Theatre, 1935-1939, has
been carefully rehearsed by historian Jane DeHart Matthews ( Princeton University Press, 1967). The
Federal Theatre Project was one of
four arts components (the others
being the Art, Music, and Writers
projects) of the Works Progress Administration, the Roosevelt Administration's massive effort to put the
unemployed back to work. According to Professor Matthews, W.P.A.
administrator Harry Hopkins nurtured a special concern for artists
victimized by the Great Depression.
Hopkins' choice for a director of the
theatre project was Vassar drama
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Political enemies of Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal programs found the
Federal Theatre to be an easy mark in their efforts to discredit the President.
prof or Halli Flanagan Davis, a
tud nt in th famed George Pierce
Baker ' 47 Workshop" in drama at
Harvard, pecialist in modern European theatre, and Hopkins' former cla mate at Grinnell College.
Together, these two idealists hoped
to forge a 'free, adult, and uncenored' theatre from a large, diverse,
and geographically-dispersed population of unemployed theatre professionals, and to use this theatre as
a means of relief, not only for unemployed actors and craftspeople, but
also for the millions of people whom
the Depression had deprived of entertaining and educational diversions.
The story of the Federal Theatre
is that of a dozen or so notable successes, some spectacular, others
heart-warming, in spite of various
obstacles that would lead to the
project's termination. It was Flanagan's idea to create a decentralized
national theatre, subsidized by the
government, modeled to some extent on the state theatres of Europe.
With this goal in mind she set out to
win an audience around the U.S.
with performances of every kind,
including straight drama, musical
revues and vaudeville, children's
plays, marionettes, and opera. Flanagan also encouraged experimentation, and the FTP became famous for
developing an entirely new form of
drama called "the living newspaper,"
which today's television viewer
might dub "docu-drama." Federal
Theatre productions played to well
over thirty million people, many of
whom had never seen live theatre.
Despite Flanagan's attempt to decentralize the Federal Theatre, the
project fared best in the large urban
centers, especially Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York. One of Chicago's memorable contributions was
The Swing Mikado, an original adaptation of the Gilbert and ullivan
operetta performed by an all- egro
cast. Indeed, one of the mo t important contribution of the FTP a
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a whole was the opportunity it provided Black actors and actresses for
whom discrimination was as much a
problem in the theatre as it was in
society at large.
In New York the Negro Theatre
Project was among the first of the
Federal Theatre's groups to begin
work. Its director, John Houseman,
moved into Harlem's old LaFayette
Theatre, hired nearly eight hundred
people from the relief roles, and
chose Macbeth as the company's first
production. In order to insure an
energetic, excellent, and innovative
debut, Houseman secured Orson
Welles, an en/ant terri"ble barely out
of his teens. Welles set the tragedy
in nineteenth-century Haiti with
Shakespeare's witches replaced by
Voodoo priestesses. The brilliant
"Voodoo Macbeth" was a critical and
popular success. It played for ten
sold-out weeks in Harlem and two
months more on Broadway before
going on a triumphal national tour,
all under the auspices of the Federal
Theatre.
The Federal Theatre Project
could point to successes other than
those of its Negro projects. Among
its undisputed achievements were
productions of Murder in the Cathe-

drat and Dr. Faustus, both presented
by the Houseman-Welles team; OneThird of a Nation, a living newspaper
about wretched living conditions
during the Depression; Prologue to
Glory, a Lincoln play; Sinclair
Lewis's It Can 't Happen Here, a warning about indigenous fascism; and
Shaw's Androcles and the Lion. Unfortunately for the FTP and its director, high-quality productions
were all but incompatible with the
concept of a relief project. The architects of the W.P.A., and even more
so the Congress which funded it,
conceived its role as one of employing and paying people for the shortest time possible before returning
them to a recovering private sector.
Hallie Flanagan's dreams of a national theatre notwithstanding, continuity of personnel and programs
was the rarest commodity in th
Federal Theatre.
Political enemies of Franklin
Roosevelt and hi
ew D al programs found the F d r al Th atr
to be an ea y mark in th eir effort
to discredit the President. Wh n it
productions were exc 11 nt and w 11received , th FTP wa a u · d f
competing with privat th atri a l
enterpri e. Wor , th Pr j t was
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The 1983 revival of The Cradle Will Rock opens with a reading that explicitly
recalls the events that led up to the 1937 premier of the 'labor musical."
attacked, e pecially by Republican
members of Congress, for harborincr
political leftists, working-cla agitators, and communist sympathizers
and for producing plays that were
salacious, unpatriotic, or simply
worthless. Finally, as Malcolm Cowley wrote, the lower-middle classes
distrusted anything connected with
the theatre, "a sentiment that survives from the seventeenth century,
when the stage, to good Puritans,
was not only the devil's workshop
but also the chief amusement of their
enemies the aristocrats. Thus the
theatre project was damned for its
royalist antecedents as well as for its
working-class sympathies." Under
duress of such attacks, W.P.A. officials became censors of their own
project.

III
Houseman had left the Negro
Theatre Project to assume the leadership of the Federal Theatre's
Classical Unit, or "Project 891," as it
came to be called. It was in this context, perhaps, that his collaboration
with Orson Welles reached its highest artistic achievement. After they
had established themselves with
productions of Horse Eats Hat and
The Tragical History of Dr. Faustus at
the Maxine Elliott theatre, Marc
Blitzstein brought his play with
music to the pair. Welles was particularly keen about working in
musical theatre and after the composer had played and sung the piece
for an enthusiastic Hallie Flanagan,
The Cradle Will Rock was announced
as the next production of W.P.A.
Project 891.
In his inspiring memoir, RunThrough, John Houseman describes
the events that led up to The Cradle
Will Rock's premier. As with all
Houseman-Well es productions, the
preparations were elaborate and, at
times, frantic. Will Geer and Howard DaSilva as Mister Mister and
Larry Foreman led the cast through
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the how' complicated erie of
ballad , aria , en emble and choru
number a well a th corre ponding dance routin . The many cene
change of the work were to be managed by a sy tern of gla s-bottomed
scenic wagons, which would apparently have given the production a
cinematic flow.
Some weeks before the opening, a
W.P.A. official watched a runthrough of the show and pronounced it' magnificent." Ten days
before opening 18,000 tickets had
been sold and on June 14 the rehearsal period culminated in a preview performance before a full house
at the Maxine Elliott. But on June
12, Houseman and his staff received
a memo from the W.P.A. in Washington prohibiting "because of impending cuts ,and reorganization,
any new play, musical performance,
or art gallery to open before July l."
Houseman and Welles suspected
that the W.P.A. had postponed the
show because its content was "dangerous" and would eventually censor the production. Protests were
lodged; special pleas were pled to
no avail. The opening performance
at the Elliott would not take place.
The 1983 revival of The Cradle
Will Rock opens with a reading from
Run-Through retelling the events
that led up to the 1937 premier of the
"labor musical." (In New York,
Houseman himself appeared on
stage to perform the reading.) The
section is too long to quote here,
but I recommend it to you as a memoir of a time when a theatre piece in
this country was considered serious
enough to be banned by the government. In short, Houseman, Welles,
and Bli tzstein and their actors and
production team set about to find
another theatre to produce the show
under their own auspices. They
found a theatre, but in the meantime the Actors' Equity Association
had prohibited member actors on
the Federal Theatre Project from
performing The Cradle on stage un-

d r an
th r mana m nt. R fu ·ing t
n d d f at, H u man
u
t d that Equit had n t pr hibited th a tor fr m p rf rmin
onl from p rf rming on stage. Wh n
th huge audi n , which had
walked tw nty blo k uptown to the
enice theatr , ttl d in it eat ,
Marc Blitz tein came out on tage
alone, sat at an upright piano, and
began to play and ing Moll's opening lines, fully intending to sing all
the parts him elf if necessary.
"It was a few seconds," Housem.an
writes,
before we realized that to Marc's strained
tenor another voice - a faint. wavering soprano-had been added . It was not clear at
first where it came from .. . . Then , hearing
the words taken out of his mouth . Marc
paused, and at that moment the spotlight
moved off the stage, past the proscenium
arch into the house, and came to rest on
the lower left box where a thin girl in a
green dress with dyed red hair was standing, glassy-eyed . stiff with fear , only half
audible at first in the huge theatre but
gathering strength with every note.

The performance continued, "a
breeze" after that first courageous
act, with Marc Blitzstein playing
and calling out essential stage directions and the singers and actors performing from the house. Houseman
and Welles, severing their association with the FTP, went on to produce The Cradle Will Rock at the
famed Mercury theatre.
The 1983 revival of The Cradle is
played from a bare stage. A piano
player is surrounded by twenty cafe
chairs where the actors sit waiting
to come to the front to perform the
numbers without the aid of sets or
elaborate props. The company is
excellent-Moll is played by Patti
LuPone, the original Broadway
"Evita" - and there are moments
when the viewer is surrounded by
the excitement that, in John Houseman's words, "is generated on those
rare and blessed occasions when the
theatre is suddenly swept into the
historical mainstream of its time."
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A Name Is a Name
Is an Identity
Dot Nuechterlein
My parents named me Dorothea
Ida after two people- my older
brother Theodore and my paternal
grandmother. I liked them both,
but I've never liked either name. I
suspect that's because even as a child
I felt somehow the names were
theirs: Dorothea Ida wasn't really
me.
Fortunately my parents also gave
me a nickname, and until high
school I never met another Dot.
Movie magazines used it for Dorothy
Lamour (you do remember Dorothy
Lamour?), and occasionally a storybook or cartoon character with that
name popped up, but in my world,
Dot was exclusively mine. To this
day it remains the only name in my
head for myself.
My legal name is actually Dorothea Jane. Someone in the small maternity hospital where I was born
apparently blundered when registering me in the Ohio vital-statistics.
My parents didn't bother with a correction (after all, the church records
were right), and I haven't either,
since this second identity always
seemed a bit exotic.
At age ten I took a fancy to Jane
and attached it to poetry, secret stories, and the school paper I tried to
establish. Alas, one-room country
schools have too few pupils to provide either news or audience: that
venture failed, as did my attempts to
get others to call me Jane-their
October, 1983

The question vexes: if names are simply symbols
of ourselves, then just who do we think we are?
habits were stronger than my wishes.
Today the only reminder, apart
from a faded blue birth certificate,
is the middle name of my oldest
child.
No matter. I discovered that as a
name, Dot has a lot going for it. It
cannot be mispronounced, which is
a blessing to one whose maiden and
married surnames are regular! y
mangled. Likewise, it cannot be
misspelled. Oh, my immigrant
grandfather, who got by in a dozen
languages, addressed the only letter
he ever sent me to "Dadie," but
that's exceptional. The only problem I have with this name is that
some people just won't use it.
A few simply do not like the informality of nicknames. Yet I figure
if a fellow could take the oath of office as President of these United
States using Jimmy, I in my humble
station should have the freedom to
go by Dot. Besides, one of my friends
(YOU KNOW WHO YOU ARE!)
who criticizes my signing Dot to
these columns never seems to use
her own given name.
But some of those who won't use
Dot don't get Dorothea straight,
either, and Dorothy, Dorthea, and
other variations irritate because they
are inaccurate. A handful of friends
use my childhood name Dottie,
which is fine, except it always sounds
a trifle funny to my ears, and seeing
it in print puts me psychologically
back in the second grade.
So over the yea.rs I have continually confronted the name business,
and I wrestled with naming-as-partof-identity long before learning that
philosophers, social thinkers, and
theologians (Cf. baptism) discuss the
phenomenon.
Helen Keller suppo edly said that
she became truly human only aft r
she realized that everything - every
person, object, idea-had a nam ,
herself included. It i by namin
them that we di tingui h on entit
from another.
Which brings u to th probl m f

addressing a married woman by her
husband's name. And this i's a problem today: social rules have changed,
and we confront such a variety of
practices we hardly know what to
call anyone.
Once upon a time it was necessary
to know whether or not a woman was
married, since neither unmarried
nor widowed singles could survive
independently. Forms of address
told the world who was what: Mrs.
John Smith had a husband to support her; Mrs. Jane Smith's husband
had died (or deserted her); Miss
June Smith had never had one. Today these distinctions are unnecessary, so they go largely unobserved.
When I took the vows two decades
ago it was unusual for a woman to
keep her name; the switch was difficult for me, and while gradually
adjusting to the new last name I did
everything possible to remain Dot.
Mr. & Mrs. Himself is great for
"couple" things, but not when the
reference is to only one. Through
the years I thought I f lt this way
because of my peculiar nam -consciousness, but now I find that I hav
been part of a larger o ial chang .
The majority of today' Am rican
women are in the labor f r , a u 'tomed to seeing their own nam ' on
paychecks, tax tat m nt , and d k
plaques. It i not urpri ing that th y
seem le
likely to pi tur th m selve a Mr . Hu band than wa
common wh n few w rk d ut id
their own hou hold .
The chan
ited to th
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